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This thesis research project “Reforming local extrabudgetary funds in Egypt: 
Lessons from China” was supervised by Jennifer Bremer and Khaled Zakaria Amin, and 
submitted to the American University of Cairo by Domenica Gräfin von Preysing-
Lichtenegg-Moos. 
It engages with the question of how to reform local extra-budgetary funds (EBFs) in 
Egypt, in explicit recognition of their high costs and risks to good budget governance, as 
well as their potential both, to boost local needs-based development now and, in the mean 
time, to provide a valuable testing ground for fiscal decentralisation reforms in the future, 
as the experience of China demonstrates. Progressing analytically from the general to the 
specific, this research starts by extracting general lessons from comparing and contrasting 
international public finance advice on EBFs with the experience of China in the context 
of national fiscal decentralisation reform since the 1980s. These provide the foundation 
for a SWOT analysis of the local EBF governance framework in Egypt. The final section 
applies both transferrable international lessons learned and national insights gained to the 
case of governorate-level local services and development account management, and 
develops short-term reform recommendations. The conclusion synthesises this research 
project’s findings into a single local EBF reform strategy outline for Egypt.  
Findings are based on a review of the public finance literature on EBFs and on the 
Chinese experience, a review of the pertinent Egyptian legislation and literature, and 
structured, open-ended interviews with stake holding senior Egyptian officials and 
researchers.  
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In spite of numerous decentralisation reform initiatives, Egypt so far remains one 
of the most centralised countries in the world. Local administrations have no taxation 
power and are highly constrained in their fiscal autonomy. Most local revenue derives 
from central government transfers, which are allocated to existing local consumption 
expenditure and to centrally planned investment projects with little systematic 
consideration for local priorities. The consequent relative absence of disposable capital at 
the lower administrative levels undermines localities’ budgetary flexibility along with 
their ability to initiate local needs-based developments (Abd El-Latif: 2009; Abd El 
Mutallib El Ghanim: 2005; Mayfield: 1996; Sawy: 1995). 
 
A notable exception to this state of affairs, however, is the provision for local Special 
Funds and the Local Services and Development Accounts (LSDA).1 These permit 
localities to retain certain earmarked non-tax revenues like user charges and fines, 
voluntary contributions, as well as returns from revenue-generating projects and sale of 
public assets to finance own local expenditure programmes independently from the 
general budget. As such, the LSDA and local Special Funds constitute the mechanism 
with which all sub-national level administrations in Egypt are legally mandated to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   Originally	   according	   to	   the	   local	   administration	   law	   No.	   43	   /	   1979	   as	   amended:	   Art.	   35	   –	   38	  (governorate	   level);	   Art.	   43	   (district	   level);	   Art	   51	   &	   53	   (town	   level);	   Art.	   69	   –	   71	   (village	   level);	  further	   decrees	   and	   executive	   regulations	   govern	   their	   diverse	   financial	   sources	   and	   uses	   across	  administrations.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  legal	  and	  functional	  introduction	  to	  what	  this	  research	  identifies	  as	  ‘local	  EBFs’	  in	  Egypt,	  please	  refer	  to	  Appendix	  A	  and	  section	  IV.1.	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enhance public service levels and local socio-economic development on a local priority 
needs basis. 
Due to the extent to which these LSDA and Special Funds share many characteristics of 
extrabudgetary funds in China, this research treats them as ‘extrabudgetary’ hybrids. 
Even if most local EBFs have recently been incorporated into the Treasury Single 
Account System, are formally subject to fiscal audit, and their revenues and expenditures 
must be reported on-budget in the aggregate, they do operate under separate budget 
formulation and execution procedures, are in practice subjected to highly limited 
budgetary control, risk diversion to uses outside their legal mandate, and overall affect the 
accuracy and transparency of financial accounts (as explored in later sections). In the 
absence of a different widely accepted term that conveys this peculiar institutional set-up, 
local special funds and the local services and development accounts (LSDA) in Egypt are 
henceforth referred to for convenience as local extrabudgetary funds (EBFs).2 
 
At first glance, the total recorded volume of these local EBFs in Egypt may seem 
moderate: 2.62 billion LE in the FY 2007/2008, or 0.6 % of total local administration 
expenditure. When put in relation to total local investment expenditure, however, the 
volume of local EBFs in Egypt is most impressive: in FY 2008/2009, total official local 
EBF revenues equal about 77 % of the total 3.38 billion L.E. local capital expenditure bill 
for that year – a high proportion indeed, and that leaving aside unaccounted-for local 
contributions to EBF sponsored local projects (compare El Iman El Shawy, 2008a: 1n).   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  a	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  defining	  of	  extrabudgetary	  funds	  in	  application	  to	  Chinese	  and	  Egyptian	  local	  finance	  and	  a	  justification	  for	  this	  choice	  of	  terminology,	  please	  refer	  to	  appendix	  A.	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As the government of Egypt (GOE) is currently intensifying its budget management and 
decentralisation reform efforts, these local EBFs are receiving heightened attention by 
Egyptian policy makers and their advisors for three good reasons.   
 
First, there is broad agreement that local EBFs are a pragmatic yet highly problematic 
response to wider systemic weaknesses, which hinder the realisation of national local 
development objectives.  In this context of widespread budget system failures, LSDAs and 
local Special Funds3 offer important - albeit narrow - financial leeway to Egyptian local 
administrations to balance out shortcomings in the highly centralised national budget 
planning and allocation process and to initiate needs-based local socio-economic 
development projects. Yet, by definition, EBFs run counter to principles of transparent 
and accountable governance, sound fiscal policy analysis and public financial 
management, and are as such widely recognised gateways to corruption and 
embezzlement of public funds at the local administration level.  
 
Second, the experience with EBFs in Egypt to date shows that increased budgetary 
powers and flexibility at the local administration level can produce impressive local 
development. Development-oriented governors like Adel Labib, Abdel-Salam El-
Mahgoub and Fathy El Baradei have evidently made maximum use of local EBFs 
mechanisms to fulfil their local development mandate. Using their fee generation powers, 
local and business contributions, revenue-generating projects, as well as returns from 
developing and then selling formerly ‘dead’ public ‘capital’, these governors have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  legal	  and	  functional	  differentiation	  between	  these	  two	  types	  of	  local	  EBFs	  in	  Egypt,	  please	  refer	  to	  section	  IV.1	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able to finance successful, large-scale local development projects through extrabudgetary 
channels. (Bremer et al.,2009). 
 
And thirdly, at the same time, experience with EBFs across local administrations in Egypt 
shows that there is no automatic link between local budgetary flexibility and local 
economic development. This is because the capacity and creativity among local 
administrations in Egypt is highly differentiated with respect to achievements in 
extrabudgetary revenue generation, budget planning and financial management.4 
Moreover, rather than investing into enhancing local economic development and public 
service delivery, too many local administrations are letting their accumulating EBFs lie 
dormant and/or ostensibly divert them to other uses outside their original legal mandate. 
 
From these observations follows the GOE’s intention, to close these uncontrolled 
extrabudgetary gateways to haphazard local fiscal administration in the long term and 
replace them with a novel, better institutional mechanism of decentralised local public 
finance (Burthel, personal communication, July 13, 2009). In the meantime, however, 
policy makers and analysts in the Ministry of Local Development are deliberating 
alternatives to tap local EBFs’ true developmental potential and, through the achievement 
greater budget control, bring all local administrations into line. (Abdel Latif, Personal 
Communication, July 8, 2009).  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Often	  this	  is	  related	  to	  the	  profile	  of	  senior	  local	  officials	  (refer	  also	  to	  section	  V.2.2)	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II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
This thesis research project aims to contribute to this deliberation process and 
enquires: what to do about local extrabudgetary funds in Egypt in the near-term? What 
reform strategy should be adopted to maximise the local social welfare function Egypt in 
the short-term - by reducing local EBFs’ risks and costs and enhancing developmentalist 
benefits?  
 
II.1 Outline of conceptual approach 
To find the best way to approach to this research topic, searching for and 
analysing policy advice and similar experiences on the international level is crucial as in 
fact, this particular reform issue in Egyptian local administration is representative of the 
much broader issue area of extrabudgetary Funds (EBFs) in Egypt and abroad. Generally 
perceived of as symptoms of budget system failure, EBFs constitute a large and persistent 
issue not just in the developing world, representing between 10% and 40 % of total 
expenditure in any country, and the search for reform policy solutions is ongoing (Allen 
& Radev, 2006: 11; Schiavo-Campo in Shah, 2007: 64). To be sure, EBFs can take very 
different forms, depending on the country context, the particular source of funding and 
objectives, institutional design and not least, the degree of budgetary and legislative 
control they are effectively subjected to: The hierarchical and vertical spectrum of EFBs 
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literally ranges from local “miscellaneous accounts” all the way to on-budget public 
agencies linked to central government.5  
Yet, in whatever form they come, the budgetary challenges presented by extrabudgetary 
fund management may be reduced to a common denominator: EBFs raise sensitive 
questions about the degree of fiscal, political and citizen control over their use.6  First, 
with respect to fiscal budget control, EBFs by definition epitomise the transparency and 
accountability challenge to sound budgeting, fiscal policy analysis and public financial 
management. Second, with respect to political budget control, EBFs challenge the central 
government’s capability to dictate the objectives for which extrabudgetary expenditure is 
made. And third, with respect to citizen control, where EBF budget management lacks 
transparency, it challenges citizens’ ability to influence and monitor the appropriate 
spending of their contributions and the fidelity of officials to the formal rules and 
regulations on handling public funds.  
 
But eventually – and this is the first premise guiding this research project’s local EBF 
reform proposals - it is the effective weighted combination of these three budget control 
dimensions - fiscal, political and citizen - that determines the effective risk to social 
welfare posed by extrabudgetary funds. 
 
Hence, the second premise of this research project: fiscal control is not everything. 
Technical fiscal reforms to abolish, privatise or to consolidate EBFs into the general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  defining	  EFBs,	  please	  refer	  to	  appendix	  A.	  6	  The	  author’s	  concept	  of	  budget	  control	  as	  presented	  here,	  is	  based	  to	  an	  important	  extent	  on	  Schick’s	  (2007	  (1981))	  typology	  of	  budget	  control	  along	  the	  dimensions	  of	  political,	  financial	  and	  internal	  control	  (see	  also	  section	  IV.1.3)	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budget may yield disappointing results if political and public budget control to ensure 
compliance in the interest of the polity are lacking, be it for lack of political will or lack 
of capacity: “In conditions of perfect governance, a plethora of EBFs may not be a major 
problem; in conditions of extremely weak governance, a fully unified budget would not 
be a solution.” (Schiavo- Campo in Shah, 2007: 63).  
 
This becomes clear when comparing and contrasting insights from the generalist literature 
by International Finance experts and the literature on the experience of China since the 
1980s in particular.7 China’s experience shows that its proliferating local EBFs are not 
only costly budget system failures, which the central government has failed to eliminate 
for too long. It also shows that local EBFs can constitute important political economy 
variables in the process of economic and fiscal reform and therefore require careful 
attention by policy makers. For instance, local extrabudgetary special funds in the initial 
stages of fiscal decentralisation reform constituted a crucial ‘incentive structure’ for the 
lower level Chinese bureaucracy to push for record rural economic development 
(MacIntyre, 2000: 249; Montinola et al., 1995). And as Zhan (2008) demonstrates, the 
sequenced reform actions against proliferating local Special Funds in China especially 
since the early 1990s was a phased product of careful central government balancing acts 
between political (internal and external) and macroeconomic costs as well as available 
institutional capacity (see also Ma, 2008).8   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  On	  the	  high	  relevance	  of	  China’s	  experience	  for	  Egypt,	  please	  refer	  below,	  to	  section	  III.1.1	  8	  Sequenced	  Chinese	  central	  government	  reform	  actions	  involved the selective crack down on illegal 
local EBFs, and progressive on-budget consolidation and elimination of many legal EBFs ( cf. section 
IV.2.3)	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The final and third premise of this research project is that reform proposals for local 
extra-budgetary funds should be measured against one clearly defined central 
government yardstick objective. And the same goes for reform proposals in the budget 
and decentralisation reform process, generally. This research project is based on the 
assumption that - as in China - the guiding reform objective in Egypt is to boost equitable 
local economic development and, meanwhile, produce a positive popular legitimacy by-
effect. It is believed that working out solutions on how to get there and experimenting 
with ways to render local EBFs' budget and financial management structure more 
effective can bring real local development dividends in the short term. At the same time, 
lessons learned thanks to short-term reforms can provide invaluable input for the formal 
fiscal decentralisation reform process: They can provide clues about potential optimal 
institutional designs for Egypt’s future local fiscal administration as well as support the 
formation of basic social and human capital at the local level that is required to make a 
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II.2 Research Objective  
Following the premises presented above (cf. II.1), and in application of lessons 
learned in particular from the highly relevant experience of China with local EBF reform 
(cf. below III.1.1), this research project develops concrete reform policy 
recommendations for improving the structure and budget process of the extrabudgetary 
local services and development accounts (LSDA) at the governorate level in view of 
enhancing local development outcomes.9  
 
To arrive at concrete and pragmatic reform options for improving public budget control 
of the Egyptian LSDA, this research project progresses from the general to the specific, 
proceeding in analytical stages. The three corresponding sets of guiding research 
questions are the following: 
• Macro-analytical level: What are relevant findings and recommendations 
regarding local EBFs by international financial institutions? How do these 
compare with the Chinese experience with local EBFs? What transferrable lessons 
on reforming local EBFs can be identified?  
• Meso-analytical level: What issues and prospects can be identified with respect to 
the local Special Funds and LSDA in Egyptian local administration? What are 
main strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats connected to the current 
local extrabudgetary governance system in Egypt?  
• Micro-analytical level: What policy options and reforms are to be recommended 
for the governorate-level LSDA in particular, and what is their implementation 
risk? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The	  rationale	  for	  choosing	  the	  LSDA	  as	  a	  specific	  reform	  case	  study	  are	  set	  out	  in	  section	  5.1.	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II.3 Previous research 
Researchers’ interest in the issue of extrabudgetary funds has risen markedly in 
recent years. A limited number of publications can therefore provide this research project 
with a number of valuable generalist insights.  The availability of published country case 
studies of international experience with local EBF reforms comparable to the Egyptian 
case is comparatively limited, with the notable exception of China, chosen as this 
research’s focus (cf. below III.1.1). Some research on the financial management of local 
Special Funds and the LSDA has been conducted in Egypt, providing sketchy and at 
points conflicting information on their broad characteristics and uses. To date, there has 
not been a focussed attempt at comparing and informing Egypt’s experience with local 
EBFs with that of China. Nor has research explicitly engaged in a SWOT analysis of local 
EBFs in Egypt. And neither have concrete short-term reform options of the kind 
presented here been proposed to improve the budget process of the LSDAs incrementally, 
in view of unravelling their real developmentalist long-term potential for localities across 














The methodology of this research project is described in successive stages in this 
chapter, in correspondence to the three sets of research questions set out under II.2. The 
following sections deal with first, the macro-analytical (Chapter IV), second, the meso-
analytical (Chapter V), and third, with the micro-analytical level (chapter VI) of this 
research. A final section on the method of data collection and interpretation concludes 
this brief methodological discussion on the reasons for and the limitations of the 
methodology applied here.  
 
III.1 On Chapter IV: The macro-analytical Level 
The first research stage consists of a literature review with a focus on 
conceptualising local EBFs. We engage critically with relevant public finance policy 
analysis and advice on EBFs in relation to the experience of China with local EBFs since 
the 1980s in particular (macro-analytical level).10 From this comparative review, we 
generate a budget control reform strategy for extrabudgetary funds (EBF) in Egyptian 
local administration in the form of a set of transferrable general reform policy guidelines. 
This budget control strategy on local EBFs guides the subsequent two stages of this 
research project. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  On	  the	  high	  relevance	  to	  Egypt	  of	  the	  Chinese	  experience	  with	  local	  EBFs	  refer	  below,	  section	  III.1.1	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III.3.1. On the relevance of China’s experience with local EBFs for Egypt 
On the search for relevant international experience with reforming local EBFs 
with instructive potential for Egyptian policy makers, the experience of China since the 
1980s in particular has been found to be particularly pertinent and has therefore been 
chosen as country case study. In support of this choice, a note on the transferability and 
instructiveness of lessons from China for Egyptian policy makers is clearly in order.   
 
To be sure, there are many obvious differences between China and Egypt. Dramatic 
differences exist not only regarding the respective countries’ size, culture and politico-
institutional history but also with respect to the recorded volume of local EBFs. It remains 
disproportionately greater in China than in Egypt, both in absolute and in relative terms. 
Whereas in China, according to a recent estimate, local extrabudgetary revenue now 
accounts for about 20 % of total fiscal revenue (Zhan, 2009a:2), in Egypt it accounts only 
for about 2% of total fiscal revenue (calculated from El Imam El Shawy, 2009: 6, 18). 
Nevertheless, we contend that it is hardly far-fetched to extract lessons from the Chinese 
experience with reforming local Special Funds for Egypt for a number of important 
reasons, as set out in the following. 
 
First, there are clear parallels between the centralised, étatist basis from which fiscal and 
budgetary reform processes have successfully taken off in China from the 1980s in 
particular and are now beginning to take off in Egypt.  To an important extent, China’s 
experience with fiscal decentralisation and budgetary reform can be regarded an 
instructive, future “road map” for Egypt on how a unitary, authoritarian state may 
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approach such reformist challenges with astounding success and without having to give 
up on its administration’s institutionalised core characteristics:  
“In both countries, party structures at the national and local level are the locus for 
many of the key policy decisions, whether that party is China’s Communist Party or 
Egypt’s National Democratic Party” and “in Egypt and China alike, influential 
private sector leaders often hold positions in the party and in local and national 
governing structures, such as popular councils or state-sponsored chambers of 
commerce.” (Bremer, 2009: 4) 
 
A second, related point is that arguably there are notable parallels between the chief 
national reform policy objectives in both countries - that is, economic reform and fiscal 
decentralisation to enhance growth, local socio-economic development, macro-fiscal 
stability and state legitimacy. Contrary to what keen observers would have liked to see, 
democratisation has neither been the prime motivation behind nor the result 
accompanying the decisive decentralisation reform agenda of Chinese policy makers. 
Much rather, the result has been the achievement of greater popular legitimacy for the 
autocratic, unitary state in China. 
 
Third, what is also worth exploring with a view to Egypt is the correlation between 
record rural socio-economic development and the proliferation of locally initiated and 
established special funds and accounts in China within the context of sweeping 
decentralisation and economic reforms since the early 1980s. Empirical studies support 
the argument that structural incentives to autonomous fiscal innovation on the local level 
– both within and even beyond the scope of what is formally permitted - can have 
significant pay-offs in terms of boosting rural socio-economic development and overall 
GDP growth, and along with it also popular legitimacy. What is more likely to bode quick 
success, allowing local experimentation or pressing for comprehensive, controlled 
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decentralisation via up front legal reform, or whether the two may actually be phased 
and/or combined is an intriguing strategic issue set for Egyptian policy makers to 
consider on the basis of the Chinese experience with local EBFs.  
 
Fourth, China and Egypt share a common characteristic with respect to the unique 
nature of their local EBFs. As noted in the introduction, extra-budgetary funds are a 
common phenomenon across the world, normally intended to keep certain expenditure 
functions outside the regular budgetary control and approval process and to set aside a 
hypothecated source of funding for them. The difference between China and Egypt on the 
one hand, and other emerging economies like the Eastern European countries is, that in 
the latter EBFs are appropriated mainly from regular budgetary revenue, which is not the 
case, either in China or Egypt where local EBFs revenue consists of non-tax local 
revenues comprising contributions, fees and charges (Compare Zhan, 2008: 3). Thus, the 
Chinese experience is much more instructive for Egypt than that of other emerging 
economies.  
 
Fifth, the Chinese experience with reforming local EBFs stands out as strikingly well 
researched and documented, enabling a truly multidimensional perspective on the issues 
surrounding local special funds and accounts. Rather than patching together a mosaic of 
findings on issues surrounding local EBFs across emerging economies, which is bound to 
be of dubious validity and instructiveness given limited, highly differentiated country data 
availability across countries and the very different, often unrelated research foci of studies 
(cf. e.g. MacIntyre, 2000; Wynne, 2005), this research prefers to focus on the single well-
documented country case study of China. Especially so, because the available academic 
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literature on China literally allows the analyst to track a large part of the Chinese 
‘lifecycle’ of local extrabudgetary funds: from the reasons why they were created and 
their proliferation tolerated, their benefits, risks and costs to the governance system over 
time, and the policy actions taken to rein them in, including real impacts made by central 
government so far.  
 
Also, because the challenge of local special funds to fiscal management in China has 
taken on exponential proportions compared to Egypt, it offers a high-contrast “larger than 
life” picture of highly instructive relevance to Egypt with respect to what should be 
avoided and/or accounted for in the first stages of fiscal decentralisation reform.11 Hence, 
the relative completeness and richness in contrast of the picture of local EBFs in China as 
portrayed in the literature allows relatively more meaningful comparisons and contrasts 
with the findings and recommendations of the theoretical, generalist literature published 
by the International Finance Institutions (IFIs) than a cross-country perspective. It 
therefore promises the distillation of particularly instructive lessons for Egypt. 
 
III.2 On Chapter V: The Meso-analytical Level  
In the second stage of this research project (the meso-analytical level), we clarify 
context-specific institutional and structural dynamics of local extrabudgetary funds in 
Egypt. A brief legal and functional introduction to local EBFs in Egypt sets the stage for a 
SWOT analysis of the local EBF governance framework in Egypt in view of upcoming 
fiscal decentralisation reforms.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Note	  that	  extrabudgetary	  revenue	  in	  fact	  exceeded	  general	  budget	  revenue	  in	  China	  in	  the	  early	  nineties.	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Conducted from the perspective of the central government of Egypt and based on this 
project’s research premises (as defined above, II.1), this SWOT analysis points out the 
main internal strengths and weaknesses common to local extrabudgetary funds in Egypt at 
present. It further relates these to the future opportunities and threats inherent to this local 
financing mechanism - the latter with a particular reference to the fiscal decentralisation 
reform outlook in Egypt. The effort is guided by Bryson’s (2004:124) definition of the 
value and purpose of SWOT analysis in public institutions, as follows: 
This information can be used […] to create ideas for strategic interventions that 
can shape and guide organisational decisions and actions designed to create public 
value. Strengths and weaknesses are usually internal and refer to the present 
capacity of the organisation, whereas opportunities and challenges [or threats 
(note by the author)] are typically external and refer to future potentials for good 
or ill. These distinctions between internal and external and between present and 
future are fluid, however…” 
 
Thus, the SWOT analysis intends to provide a conceptual framework to inform the policy 
dialogue on how to enhance the developmental potential of local EBFs now, while 
managing their risks to sound budget management into the future. 
 
The reader is asked to take note that the findings of the SWOT analysis presented here are 
to some extent generalising, in an analytical departure from the governorate-level of local 
administration in Egypt, which has been chosen as this research’s focus. Therefore, this 
SWOT analysis may not have the same degree of applicability to all local EBFs at all 
local administration levels, given that there is in fact some variation in the institutional 
structure and management of the various local EBFs on the different levels of Egyptian 
local administration.12 This should, however, not be considered a question of validity but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  For	  example,	  LSDA	  management	  on	  city	  administration	  level	  tends	  to	  display	  a	  stronger	  accountability	  link	  to	  the	  respective	  Local	  Popular	  Council	  than	  on	  the	  governorate	  level.	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rather a matter of degree of applicability of the findings presented in Chapter V to further 
context-specific study of particular local extrabudgetary funds. 
 
III.3 On Chapter VI: The Micro-analytical Level 
The third and final micro-analytical stage of this research project applies both 
Chinese lessons learned, and national insights gained from the previous research stages. 
An applied case study of the governorate-level local services and development accounts 
(LSDA) converts these into concrete near-term EBF reform policy recommendations for 
Egypt. A legal-regulatory analysis of the LSDA budget structure and process offers a 
number of reform policy options on how to increase budget control - especially citizen 
budget control -, including an implementation risk assessment for each. 
 
III.3.1 Rationale for choosing the governorate-level LSDA as a case study 
A note justifying our choice of case local EBF case study is expedient. The 
governorate-level LSDA has been chosen as the specific reform case study out of the 
plethora of local extrabudgetary funds that exist on the different local administration 
levels in Egypt for the following main reasons:  
 
First, the LSDA is the only type of local extrabudgetary fund that has a clear uniform 
legal basis across all local administrations and administration levels as defined primarily 
by ministerial decree number 8 of the year 1976 (“On the organisation of the services 
account in the local units”) and the local administration law number 43 from the year 
1979.  The many local extrabudgetary Special Funds that exist aside from the LSDA have 
structures that differ widely across local administrations due to their establishment and 
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governance primarily by governorate executive regulation. Also, certain special Funds 
only exist on certain local administration levels. 
 
Second, focussing exclusively on the LSDA in the implementation discussion provides 
the analysis with greater depth without sacrificing general applicability of the proposed 
reform policy options. The challenges encountered in reforming the budget process for 
the LSDA are bound to present themselves also in the management of the local special 
funds.  
 
Third, the LSDA are the local EBFs that should be targeted first to achieve greater local 
development in the shortest time frame. This is because they are by definition 
“independent” funds, which may be used for all types of expenditure, thus enabling a 
wide-angled project development – as opposed to the local Special Funds, which are in 
theory earmarked and designated for specific types of expenditure along fragmented 
sectoral lines.  
 
Fourth, focussing on the governorate-level LSDA promises greatest reward in terms of 
local development outcomes from reform because this particular account has the highest 
concentration of local finance across all local administration levels and units in Egypt (El 
Emam El Shawy, personal communication, July 26, 2009).  
Fifth, and finally, analysing and reforming the budget process of the LSDA may be 
considered a valuable experimental testing ground. Success or failure of reform here can 
provide telling lessons for the formal decentralisation reform process to come and give 
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clues as to what works and what doesn’t in reforming Egyptian local fiscal 
administration.  
 
III.4 Method of Data Collection 
Three main sources inform this research project’s findings on the meso- and 
micro-analytical level: a review of pertinent legislation, structured, open-ended interviews 
with stake holding senior Egyptian officials and researchers and a review of relevant 
literature on Egyptian local public finance. Respective strengths and shortcomings of 
these sources, as well as how they were dealt with, are described in turn. 
 
The review of Egyptian legislation and regulation pertinent to local special funds and the 
services and development accounts (LSDA) has revealed the complexity of the regulatory 
environment surrounding local EBFs in Egypt (for a chart of key legislation please refer 
to appendix D). This is why this study has chosen not to provide a descriptive, full 
overview of the regulatory environment of local EBFs and instead to discuss it issue by 
issue, in direct relation to the line of argument running through chapter V and VI. Law 
no. 43 of 1979 (local administration law) and ministerial decree no. 8 of 1976 will find 
particular mention throughout this research because they may be considered legal 
common denominator of local EBFs across Egyptian local administrations.13  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  There	  are	  of	  course	  more	  common	  laws	  and	  regulations	  that	  apply	  to	  local	  special	  funds	  and	  accounts	  and	  their	  use,	  for	  example	  the	  general	  budget	  law	  no.	  53	  of	  1973	  as	  amended,	  the	  public	  tender	  law	  no	  89	  of	  1998	  and	  its	  amendments	  that	  governs	  purchases	  with	  public	  money,	  the	  presidential	  decree	  no.	  139	  of	  2006	  on	  local	  accountability,	  etc	  pp.	  For	  a	  list	  of	  key	  legislation	  refer	  to	  appendix	  D.	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The reader is asked to take further note that in addition to what is set down by law, each 
and every governorate administration in Egypt can, and in most cases does, produce its 
own executive regulations governing each and every one of the various local special 
funds in its jurisdiction. These require the approval by the Ministry of Finance, where 
they are also supposed to be kept on archive (Diaa El Din, Personal communication, 
August 5, 2009). A complete review of these would have gone beyond the scope of this 
research. 
 
Second, we have conducted a number of structured, open-ended interviews with senior 
representatives of Egyptian academia and government to explore further the structure and 
functions of local EBFs as well as the different views and approaches of senior 
stakeholders to the question of reforming them. (Cf. Appendix B for a list of interviewees 
and interview questions).  The reason why not more local officials have been consulted as 
part of the formal interviewing process is that informal consultations have shown that  - in 
contrast to central government officials and senior researchers in the field - local officials 
appear to have only marginal interest in a change of the status quo, thus promising only 
little additional information in support of central government reform proposals.  
 
Third, the information gained in interviews and from the legislative review was compared 
and contrasted in both directions with the small number of available publications on local 
extrabudgetary funds and accounts in Egypt. This was done in order to fill informational 
voids, clarify potential misunderstandings or contradictions on both ends, as well as to 
point out potential contributions to our SWOT analysis and policy recommendations. 
Indeed, Egyptian publications on local EBFs provide only sketchy information as to their 
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broad characteristics and uses. It should be noted, however, that these can only be as 
complete and accurate as the information willingly provided - an inherent limitation, 
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IV. TOWARDS A LOCAL BUDGETARY REFORM STRATEGY: INSIGHTS 
FROM THE LITERATURE 
 
The literature on extrabudgetary funds with particular relevance to the reform 
policy debate in Egypt on local Special Funds and the LSDA falls broadly into two main 
categories. The first ‘theoretical-generalist’ category comprises publications by the 
International Finance Institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD 
(hereafter referred to as ‘IFI literature’). The second ‘empirical’ category encompasses 
precious few developing country case studies on EBFs, of which the Chinese experience 
with local EBFs has been singled out as country case study to guide this research 
project’s budgetary reform strategy (due to its particular relevance to the Egyptian policy 
debate for reasons explored above, section III.1.1). 
 
This chapter aims to clarify the issue sets emerging from the theoretical- generalist and 
the empirical literature on extrabudgetary funds in Chinese local government, and to 
compare and contrast their respective reform policy strategy implications with particular 
relevance to Egypt (as discussed in later sections). The first section of this chapter 
presents the findings of the normative IFI literature on the reasons for creating extra-
budgetary funds, their attendant risks and costs, and main policy recommendations. The 
second section begins by identifying the primary issue sets emerging from the Chinese 
experience with extra-budgetary funds on the local administration level and compares and 
contrasts these with the findings and recommendations of the theoretical IFI literature as 
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developed in the preceding section.  It then goes on to present briefly the Chinese 
experience with local EBFs since the early 1980s with a focus on central government 
efforts to restrain them and later on, to manage and eliminate them. The third, concluding 
section of this part sums up insights gained from the IFI literature and the experience of 
China and sets out its implications for this thesis project’s research agenda in Egypt in the 
form of a catalogue of transferrable policy guidelines on reforming local EBFs. This 
budget control strategy on local EBFs is going to guide the application stage of this 
research to Egypt in the remainder of this study. 
 
IV.1 Insights from the public finance literature on extra-budgetary funds 
Note that the IFI literature deals with local special funds and accounts as part of the 
wider issue area of EBFs. Three findings stand out from the IFI literature review:  
 
1. Public finance experts in the IFI literature tradition are highly critical of EBFs, 
emphasising their aggregate macroeconomic costs and risks to good governance 
because they run counter to the discipline’s cardinal principles of sound budgeting 
and prudent financial management (Kraan, 2004). Most authors treat EBFs chiefly 
as symptoms of budget system failure and lacking fiscal administration capacity in 
developing countries.  Exceptions are Schick (2007) and Allen and Radev (2006) 
who apply an expanded analytical spectre to consider political economy factors of 
EBFs in addition to budget system failures.  
 
2. Policy recommendations in the IFI literature advocate local EBFs’ consolidation 
into the budget and, where feasible, their merger as well as abolition. The third 
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option, quasi-commercialisation of special funds in application of the public 
agency model14, is not recommended for developing countries. Because EBFs are 
considered manifestations of underlying structural budget system failures, recent 
publications in this literature strand emphasise the need to deal with them as part 
of a comprehensive, phased budget system reform strategy (Allen, 2008). 
 
3. The strong emphasis in the IFI literature on the technical aspects of budget and 
governance reform to enhance sound budgeting practice as well as publications’ 
generalist policy advocacy function has been found to constrain its explanatory 
scope with respect to the experience with local EBF reform in emerging 
economies, namely in China. As explored in greater detail below (section IV.2), 
the observed correlation between impressive local economic development and the 
persistence of EBFs in China along with the evolving central government policy 
on local EBFs opens up questions regarding the IFI literature’s intransigent focus 
on the abolishment as well as cost and risk management of EBFs over the 
complex reasons for - and potential benefits even - of their existence, within 
particular governance configurations over time. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  A	  prominent	  example	  of	  the	  public	  agency	  model	  is	  found	  in	  Britain:	  the	  QUANGOs	  (quasi-­‐	  nongovernmental	  organisations),	  or	  NDPBs	  (non-­‐departmental	  public	  body)	  as	  they	  are	  officially	  called.	  For	  a	  technical	  definition	  of	  the	  public	  agency	  model	  cf.	  Allen	  &	  Radev,	  2006:	  19n.	  The	  agency	  model	  has	  generally	  been	  viewed	  as	  a	  convenient	  mechanism	  to	  introduce	  market	  forces	  and	  greater	  managerial	  flexibility	  in	  public	  service	  delivery	  as	  part	  of	  New	  Public	  Management	  (NPM)	  in	  developed	  countries.	  In	  the	  recent	  past	  the	  agency	  model	  has	  come	  under	  criticism	  for	  lacking	  public	  financial	  transparency	  and	  for	  hiding	  the	  true	  size	  of	  government.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  agency	  model	  relies	  on	  strong	  institutional	  environs	  and	  considerable	  public	  financial	  management	  capacity.	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Because this chapter distils only those aspects of the literature, which are relevant to this 
research’s enquiry on Egypt, the terms ‘local EBFs’ and ‘local special funds and local 
services and development accounts (LSDA)’ are used interchangeably. 
 
IV.1.1 Reasons for creating local EBFs  
To be sure, reasons for creating and perpetuating local EBFs – and conversely, 
eliminating them - invariably depend on the specific policy context under analysis. 
Nevertheless, a number of general rationales may be discerned in the IFI literature. First, 
economic arguments for EBFs are noted in this section before presenting second, the 
rationales provided by budget system failure in developing country contexts, and third, 
the political economy factors, which support the proliferation and persistence of EBFs. 
Together with the costs and risks of EBFs as identified in the subsequent section, they 
provide the conceptual framework within which the IFI literature proposes its policy 
recommendations on local EBFs. 
 
IV.1.1.1 Financial rationale: The benefit principle of taxation and earmarking  
Because special funds are by definition established for a particular expenditure 
purpose and financed from earmarked tax and/or non-tax revenue streams, such as user 
charges, fines, sale of goods and services and/or transfers from the central budget, they 
have been analysed in the context of two related principles: the benefit principle of 
taxation and the principle of earmarked taxes. 
 
The benefit principle in public finance holds that the benefits accruing to citizens from 
government expenditure programmes should be matched with the requirement to pay in 
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order to establish a link between individual payments and benefits. Considered an 
essential requirement of fiscal efficiency in local government, the benefit principle is of 
particular relevance to local administration levels, not least with a view to fiscal 
decentralisation reforms in Egypt. This is because there are local variations in 
preferences, ability to pay for, and the costs of supplying government services, of which 
local officials tend to have superior knowledge. Accordingly, because of their superior 
access to local constituencies, local authorities should be able to mobilise identified 
benefits-based revenues more effectively and extensively than the more remote central 
government - and that at lower information and transaction costs (Amin, 2006:4; 
Dorotinsky, 2008). 
 
Earmarking refers to dedicating specific revenues to specific expenditure purposes. While 
public finance experts tend to disapprove of earmarking for introducing rigidity in the 
general budget and distorting the free allocation of funds among competing demands, 
earmarking has also been advocated as a good strategy in developing country contexts to 
decompose the budget into items and thus render it more transparent. In this view, budget 
allocations on the basis of earmarking may better reflect citizens’ preferences (Allen & 
Radev, 2006: 18; Schiavo-Campo in Shah, 2007: 64).   
 
Certainly, neither economic argument implies that local special funds and independent 
accounts have to be entirely off- budget to achieve their positive effect as cast here in 
terms of the benefit principle and earmarking. At the same time, however, given that both 
principles’ underlying assumptions are less applicable in developing than developed 
country contexts, one can argue that decentralised local special funds are unlikely to 
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produce the same efficiency and welfare gains when consolidated into the regular budget 
system as is.  
 
IV.1.1.2 Budget system failures 
As briefly indicated above, the IFI literature puts strong emphasis on budget 
system failures in accounting for the creation, persistence and - in cases like China - the 
rapid proliferation of local extrabudgetary funds. The following lists three budget system 
failure related reasons extracted from the literature, which were found to be of particular 
relevance in accounting for the creation and persistence of local EBFs in China and Egypt 
alike.  
 
1. Inadequate recognition of local needs in general budget allocation:  This 
condition pertains particularly to countries where the budget system is 
concentrated in central government agencies with relatively ineffective 
mechanisms for information transmission between the centre and the local 
periphery on local socio-economic conditions and budget priorities. In such a 
setting, local authorities are incentivized to develop alternative mechanisms to 
meet expenditure requirements unmet by general budget flows (Allen & Radev, 
2006: 15). 
2. Counterproductive control and incentive mechanisms for public officials: 
although local authorities are required to operate within the general budget 
system, they prefer to and find ways to operate outside it. This happens especially 
where formal budgetary procedures and usual bureaucratic routines are perceived 
as rigid, lengthy and/or not suitable at all to certain categories of expenditure. For 
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example, EBFs may be used to avoid implementation problems encountered in 
central budget execution, due to burdensome bureaucratic controls. (Schiavo 
Campo in Shah, 2007: 61n) 
3. “Hedging against Uncertainty”:  here, the hypothecated source of freely 
disposable funding becomes a way for local officials to guard against potential 
central budget cuts in the future or simply to bolster low general budget 
allocations (not least with respect to officials’ personal salaries). The motivation 
to create a local extrabudgetary fund in this case is to provide programme stability 
and predictability beyond the current budget. (Caiden, 1974:79) 
 
IV.1.1.3 Political Economy Rationales 
As we have seen, the traditional IFI literature emphasises that EBFs result from 
rational actor responses to budget system failures. From this follows logically that the 
institutional and technical development of budget systems together with capacity building 
in administration must aim to make EBFs redundant eventually (Shah, 2007: 1- 4). While 
this traditional view appears logic by inference from Western budget reform history, it is 
still unable to account for ‘irrational’, non- technical aspects in the establishment and 
persistence of local special funds and independent accounts in both developed and 
developing countries. 
This insight has led Allen and Radev (2006) to develop a novel, more realistic 
conceptualisation of EBFs as the combined result of both budget system failures and 
political economy factors. However, most of the political economy factors cited by the 
authors pertain to the establishment EBFs at levels of government higher than the local 
level and/or to fairly sophisticated budget system settings. So far, IFI findings of acute 
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relevance to local EBFs of the like found in Egypt and China are limited. Still, three 
pertinent political economy factors for local fiscal discipline deviant behaviour may be 
distilled from the IFI literature with some interpretative elaboration:  
1. Hiding funds from public scrutiny: When citing this reason, it is mostly assumed 
that this is “usually to permit theft and abuse” by officials (Schiavo Campo, 2007: 
62) or to avoid public pressure to spend more (Allen & Radev, 2006:16). 
Additionally, in the classic work by Caiden (1974:79) on budgeting in poor 
countries it is implied that officials might also seek to hide transactions from 
government scrutiny to protect these funds from central reach, for a “rainy day”. 
2. Sidestepping appropriation management rules in the interest of powerful 
individuals: EBFs like local Special Funds can be a welcome opportunity for 
influential local officials to obtain authorisation to bend appropriation 
management rules so that they can operate with greater flexibility and keep 
relatively un-scrutinised control over the funds they generate. (Schiavo- Campo, 
2007: 61) 3. Generating (local) political support for introducing new levies: Where it can be 
convincingly communicated that a new levy is earmarked to benefit the locality, 
this can make the acceptance of the new financial burden much easier (Allen, 
2007). 	  
 
IV.1.2 Attendant risks and costs of local EBFs 
The long list of costs and risks of EBFs to fiscal policy and to sound financial 
management as developed by the IFI literature can be summed up into one rule of thumb: 
In the aggregate, local EBFs impose significant long-term costs on the overall budget and 
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macroeconomic policy. Potential welfare benefits accruing from extrabudgetary funds – if 
acknowledged - are real only from a disaggregated, short-term perspective. Under no 
circumstances are potential, isolated benefits viewed as salient enough to permit 
permanent fiscal exceptionalism. Along these lines, the following presents a synthesis of 
the major issues detected in the literature.15  
 
1. EBFs tend to proliferate and create common pool problems 
The empirical observation that EBFs tend to proliferate is of primary concern to IFIs 
(Schiavo-Campo, 2007: 63). The resultant guiding premise of the IFI literature in 
assessing risks and costs of EBFs has been succinctly described by Allen & Radev: 
“While individual EBFs may even be considered relatively benign, their aggregate impact 
on fiscal flexibility and the quality of fiscal management might be serious” (2006:24).  
Caiden and Wildavsky (Ch.2; 1974) define this deleterious aggregate effect of 
proliferating EBFs as a common pool problem. The more the overall budget becomes 
fragmented and earmarked, the more incentive officials have to create more of them, 
creating a vicious cycle, whereby the national budget is curtailed in its size and flexibility 
to the benefit of proliferating EBFs.  Potter and Diamond (1999: 25) describe this 
mechanism as follows:  
 
“In the short term, financial management will be impaired because resources 
transferred to a special account are typically not available to the treasury for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Note	  that	  these	  arguments	  truly	  apply	  only	  where	  local	  special	  funds	  compete	  with	  the	  centre	  in	  terms	  of	  revenue	  sources	  (significant	  taxation	  power	  necessary	  for	  this	  to	  apply),	  for	  example	  china;	  it	   does	   not	   at	   this	   stage	   of	   the	   reform	   process	   apply	   to	   Egypt,	   where	   local	   special	   fund	   revenue	  generation	   does	   not	   by	   any	   means	   stand	   in	   competition	   with	   central	   revenue	   generation.	  Nevertheless,	   these	   points	   must	   be	   considered	   as	   part	   of	   a	   phased	   budget	   reform	   and	  decentralisation	  strategy.	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cash management purposes. In the medium term, a shift in government 
priorities may be impeded by the fact that a part of the available resources is 
set aside for a special task.“ 
 
2. Lacking transparency and accountability of EBFs poses risks to sound financial 
management.  By definition, EBFs constitute a challenge to international fiscal 
transparency standards generating concern about inefficiency as well as misuse of funds. 
Beyond immediate concerns about facilitating rent- seeking among self-serving officials, 
EBFs have been found to exert a negative aggregate effect on sound financial 
management along three dimensions, on: 
• Fiscal discipline in terms of comprehensive budget expenditure control;  
• Efficient and effective operational and cash management 
• The optimal allocation of resources consistent with policy priorities;  
(Allen & Radev, 2006: 23; Potter and Diamond 1999: 26, Schiavo- Campo in Shah, 
2007:63, Schick, (1981) 2007: 17).  
 
3. In the aggregate, EBFs can pose serious risks to macro-fiscal policy 
The considerations of fiscal policy risks are related primarily to concerns about the 
negative impact of EBFs on sound fiscal analysis and policy formulation. Due to the 
decoupling of EBFs from the regular budget process, experts warn of EBF induced 
distortions in the assessment of the overall fiscal position and macroeconomic situation, 
including dimensions such as the true size of the public sector and its contribution to 
aggregate investment and savings (Allen & Radev, 2006: 22). 
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IV.1.3 Policy recommendations 
As the foregoing discussion has shown, EBFs like the local Special Funds and 
LSDA in Egypt, are perceived as high risk, because they inherently run counter to the 
trinity of public finance: the budget principles of universality, unity, and specificity 
(Kraan, 2004: 121n). Although in some cases, the legitimacy of creating and maintaining 
Special Funds is recognised for economic reasons or as a short-term rational response to 
budget system failures, in general, the message of the IFI is clear: disadvantages far 
outweigh the advantages of EBFs (Potter and Diamond, 1999:25).  
 
Hence, “the standard advice of international organisations to developing countries has 
been to avoid creating EBFs and to eliminate them as quickly as possible when they do 
exist.” (Schiavo- Campo, 2007: 63). Within this paradigm, however, there is variation in 
terms of the policy recommendations provided. These variations seem related to the 
respective authors’ underlying assumptions regarding the projected sophistication of the 
respective governance and budget system, not the particular institution that they speak 
for.16 
 
Kraan (2004: 125) argues intransigently that extrabudgetary funds be consolidated into 
regular on-budget documentation and subjected to regular budgetary control; potential 
systemic repercussions find no mention.  That he sees no tension between full 
incorporation of special funds into the regular budget and protection to the management 
of earmarked levies indicates that he is plainly assuming a sophisticated budget system of 
contemporary European style - without, however, explicitly saying so. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  E.g.	  both	  Allen	  &	  Kraan	  publish	  with	  the	  OECD,	  but	  have	  clearly	  divergent	  views.	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Potter and Diamond (1999: 25) take a more gradual but similar stance. They propose to 
push for the budgetary consolidation EBFs as a way to technically create facts in view of 
“persuading” authorities to consider them a legitimate part of the budget. This is viewed 
as a first necessary step to break institutional resistance and to enable fiscal authorities to 
close or reduce the number of special accounts in the longer term. However, no special 
attention is given to the factors that led to the proliferation of EBFs in the first place. 
 
Allen and Radev (2006) have proposed an alternative policy route to the traditional IFI 
recommendation to avoid and eliminate EBFs outright. The authors emphasise the need to 
deal with local EBFs in the context of the broader budget and governance reform agenda 
to be able to arrive at meaningful solutions (2006: 32 - 34). Based on a typology of 
different EBFs in terms of institutional setup, funding and objective, they propose to 
focus on managing EBFs’ risks. Proposed are three potential policy choices in need of 
evaluation for any particular case of EBF, as part of a systematic, phased budget review: 
“whether EBFs should continue to exist, be changed in form through commercialisation 
or privatisation, or be abolished.” (2006: 25, 30) 
 
Schick’s economic and political framework for extrabudgetary expenditure (originally 
presented to the OECD in 1981 and re-published in 2007) challenges his colleagues’ 
exclusive focus on fiscal budget control with a powerful three-dimensional 
conceptualisation of budget control, which was found to be of particular relevance for this 
research project.17  He defines ‘budget control’ as a dynamic result from the interaction of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Schick’s	  multidimensional	  view	  of	  ‘budget	  control’	  has	  inspired	  this	  research	  project’s	  conceptual	  approach	  as	  noted	  above,	  section	  	  II.1.	  
	   42	  
political control (the government’s capacity to achieve its expenditure policy priorities), 
financial control (in terms of financial management), and internal control (relating to the 
fidelity of spenders to basic norms of behaviour) and recommends:  
“The relationship between government and spenders […] operates through 
incentives rather than command and control […] A comprehensive budget 
process might make for a better budget but not necessarily for more control. If 
the latter is the pre-eminent objective, governments should devise new 
methods of control, leaving to secondary consideration the question of 
whether these controls should operate through the budget process […] 
governments should contemplate what might be gained and lost from this 
move.” (Schick, (1981) 2007: 36n) 
 
IV.2. Insights from experience with local extra-budgetary funds: Case Study of 
China 
A review of the literature on the Chinese experience is in many ways congruent 
with the findings of the IFI literature on the rationales and risks of EBFs in local 
government, as the following section presents. There is notable divergence, however, on 
the political economy factors contributing to the persistence of local EBFs, found to be 
the main determinant over time in the cost-benefit analyses and resultant policy stance on 
local EBFs by Chinese central government officials. This finding vindicates and still goes 
far beyond the more recently developed ‘pragmatic’ perspective in the IFI literature, as 
represented by Allen and Schick (as explored in the preceding section).  
 
What follows is a comparative enquiry into empirical proof from China regarding the 
reasons and benefits as well as risks and costs connected to local EBFs, and how these 
compare to the IFI literature as discussed before. A brief chronology of budget reform in 
China with a particular focus on anti-local EBF policy follows. The chapter concludes on 
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a synthesis of insights gained in the form of a potentially transferrable local budgetary 
reform strategy (as the subsequent chapters on Egypt will show). 
 
IV.2.1 China: Reasons & benefits of creating local special funds and accounts 
The Chinese experience is reasonably congruent with the more generalist findings 
of the IFI literature on the reasons for the creation and persistence of EBFs, especially 
with regard to budget system failure related factors. At the same time, however, it brings 
into stark evidence the limited explanatory power of these technical-rational explanations 
compared to political economy factors18, which have taken a particularly prominent and 
extensive role in shaping the Chinese experience to date.  
 
IV.2.1.1 Budget system failures 
1. Inadequate recognition of local needs in general budget allocation:  As pointed out by 
Allen and Radev, the inadequate recognition of local needs in general budget allocation 
proved indeed to be one important trigger in the proliferation of EBFs in local 
government in China, as Ma (2008:123) recounts: “Off-budgeting finance was originally 
a strategy of fiscal expediency in the face of the fiscal stringency that was in force in the 
early 1980s.” In the early reform period the creation of EBFs has therefore been generally 
considered a “rational reaction of local level government agencies facing budget 
shortages for both administrative overhead and new social and economic projects. The 
answer was purely economic. They are forced to find ways to supplement budgetary 
shortfalls.” (Lu, 2000:282) Thus, “facing the mounting pressure of fiscal shortages, local 
government agencies resort to extrabudgetary or self-raised revenues generated through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Including	  institutional	  capacity	  considerations	  
	   44	  
“fund raising”, fees”, and “endowments”. Normally, the government either recognises 
these methods as legitimate, or acquiesces to them.” (Lu, 1999: 355)  
 
2. Counterproductive control and incentive mechanisms for public officials:  
Already during the Maoist period, limited EBFs (consisting of minor taxes and 
surcharges) have been created and used primarily to avoid formal budgetary procedures 
and bureaucratic routines under the highly centralised planning regime (Oi, 1992: 105).  
This still holds true for the period of the “second revolution”:  
 
“EBR [extra-budgetary revenue] provides a more flexible and convenient 
funding source. With the authority to collect EBR, government agencies do 
not need to go through the complicated legislative and budgetary procedures 
as they do in order to obtain budgetary allocations. And the management of 
extra-budgetary funds falls within the government agencies with little 
intervention by superiors or outside departments.” (Zhan, 2008: 3) 
 
3. “Hedging against Uncertainty”:  On paper, the intergovernmental fiscal contract 
system instituted in the early 1980s, which fixed budgets over a period of up to 5 years 
(as opposed to the previous more uncertain, annual rhythm) would have provided 
heightened budget certainty compared to other developing countries (Oi, 1992: 103). But 
Ma and Norregaard’s (1998: 4) account of the 1980- 1993 fiscal contract tells another 
story: in practice, because local governments impounded locally collected shared 
budgetary revenues and thus weakened the national treasury, central government resorted 
to various ad hoc instruments to raise revenue remittances such as ad hoc fiscal contract 
revisions and forcing local governments to purchase public bonds below market rate. 
These ad hoc instruments in turn led to undesired reactions on the part of local 
governments, which felt penalised for having fast growing local revenues, and therefore 
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followed the strong incentive to further conceal their actual revenue capacities. This 
perverse incentive structure created a vicious circle, to be interrupted only by a set of 
decisive reforms in 1993 (cf. below, section 3.2.3). 
 
IV.2.1.2 Political economy factors 
As noted above, the traditional focus in the IFI literature on rational actor 
responses to budget system failures in accounting for the creation and persistence of 
EBFs like local Special Funds is severely limited in explanatory power when it comes to 
economically  ‘irrational’ aspects in their proliferation and persistence – a political 
economy critique that has been raised recently from within the discipline’s ranks but has 
not been developed far enough, yet, to fill its explanatory potential (cf. Allen & Radev, 
2006). It is hoped that observations on the EBF experience in China can contribute to a 
fuller conceptualisation of this recent political economy perspective on extra-budgetary 
activity and reform in developing countries.  
 
Such a fuller conceptualisation requires that the basic explanatory scope adopted so far in 
the IFI literature is broadened to include not only the current “bottom-up” political 
economy perspective that perceives of EBFs exclusively as a deviation in a ‘zero-sum’ 
game between the localities and state, whereby local officials are the incentivised, self-
interested, deviant actors and the central state government the hapless policy taker and 
loser.  The Chinese experience highlights that this perspective needs to be coupled with a 
second, reciprocal “top down” political economy perspective, which also explains the 
creation and proliferation of EBFs in Chinese local government also from a ‘positive-
sum’ game perspective. This second perspective accords to central government the role of 
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policy maker (as well as taker) who acts under conditions of bounded rationality to 
achieve best possible reform results in terms of economic development and growth in the 
shortest possible period of time. By ‘bounded’ we mean here, bounded by scarcity of 
resources, by the degree of administrative capacity and by political leverage at any 
particular government decision-making point in time. The following looks at both these 
perspectives in turn, as identified in the academic literature on China’s experience with 
local EBFs. 
 
Bottom-up political economy factors:  
1. Hiding funds from public scrutiny:  particularly the literature on organisational 
corruption in the Chinese bureaucracy supports this political economy factor uni sono, 
explaining at length the various ingenious techniques applied by Chinese “bureau-
preneurs” to hide funds from public scrutiny to both personal and collective 
organisational benefit. Methods applied outside regulatory controls include siphoning off 
budgetary revenues into EBFs, creating and maintaining so-called “small coffers” (secret 
saving accounts under individual names) with impounded cash from informal levies as 
well as from formal appropriations, and soliciting so-called “marginal” in-kind revenue 
from their business constituency (Lu, 1999: 356, 359; Lu, 2000: 279).  
 
2. Sidestepping appropriation management rules in the interest of powerful individuals: 
Zhan’s systematic EBR data analysis of central government action against extrabudgetary 
funds in local government strongly supports this political economy factor. Central 
government acquiescence to EBR maximisation by local governments is demonstrably 
related to local political bargaining power: “the more political power a province 
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possessed [in terms of representation in the party rank-and-file], the less likely it was for 
the centre to intervene in its collection of EBR.” (2008: 23) 
 
3. Generating (local) political support for introducing new levies: Because the literature 
on Chinese EBR consulted so far focuses primarily on the excesses in local revenue 
extraction in application of the “three unruly actions” (illicit fees, levies and 
apportionments), no concrete evidence for local political support for new levies is 
presented with the potential exception of Oi’s (1992) field study on local state 
corporatism in China. It suggests that local business and government interests are 
intimately tied up in a local institutional and fiscal incentive structure with the effect that 
local businesses expect their payments to be reinvested into the local economic 
infrastructure or at a minimum contribute to local officials’ willingness to support the 
business into the future by both formal and informal means. 
 
Top-down political economy factors: 
1. Incentivising local initiative and economic development:  
In the initial reform phase,  “in the transition from a highly centralized command 
economy to a decentralized system, and with ill defined central and local fiscal 
powers and responsibilities, EBR functions as the compensation to local agents for 
their lack of formal fiscal power.” (Zhan, 2008: 4) In recognition of the fact that 
local ability to improve public services and promote local economic development 
is directly related to fiscal capacity, and that regular budgetary revenue for 
discretionary funds is not sufficient to satisfy local needs, the central government 
has tended to acquiesce to local EBF initiatives - which in fact had a similar end 
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effect as fiscal transfers, without putting further stress on already strained 
administrative and fiscal capacities (compare Lu, 1999:355; Zhan, 2008: 9 – 11).  
 
2. Securing political support for reforms:  According to Ma (2008: 124) “the 
development of off-budgetary finance helped solve the “politically difficult 
problem” of bureaucratic restructuring by transforming the Chinese bureaucrats 
into supporters of market-oriented reforms.” And conversely, central government 
action against local EBFs is complicated by the ability of strong localities ”to 
manipulate the implementation of central command at the local level and dodge 
consequent central sanction.” (Zhan, 2008: 11) 
 
3. ‘Controlled laissez- faire’: Local EBF management in defiance of fiscal discipline 
should not just be viewed as unchecked local anarchy due to lacking institutional 
and administrative development. For example, Zhan (2008:1) explains the 
divergent pattern of central sanctioning of ad hoc taxation using local special 
funds as follows:  
“The Chinese central government is more lenient towards localities that 
use their revenues more efficiently and achieve higher economic 
development level. In a word, the centre hands out carrots to economically 
efficient localities but swings the stick over those inefficient ones.“  
 
Put differently, the central government may be characterised as working 
strategically with “what it has” and with a keen eye on boosting local socio-
economic development whilst concurrently expanding its bounds and fiscal 
controls.  Institutional weaknesses do not prevent the government from steering a 
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clear course and imposing its will on underperforming localities where it is 
deemed appropriate. 
 
IV.2.2 China: Risks and costs connected to local extrabudgetary funds 
1. EBFs tend to proliferate and create common pool problems:  This observation in the 
IFI literature holds true in the Chinese experience. Here, local EBFs proliferated at 
impressive rates: “since China’s fiscal decentralisation started in the 1980s, the volume of 
EBR has expanded so rapidly that in the early 1990s it even surpassed that of the 
budgetary revenue. Since then several rounds of central interventions and adjustments has 
brought down EBR to a fraction of budgetary revenue, but the absolute amount of EBR 
still keeps rising.” (Zhan, 2008: 2; Oi, 1992: 105) Local EBFs are also said to create 
common pool problems in China and “overgrazing” of local tax bases in some regions 
(Zhan, 2008: 6). The more the overall revenue becomes fragmented and earmarked, the 
more incentive officials have to create more of EBFs and increase charges and levies on a 
fixed tax base, creating a vicious cycle, whereby the national budget is curtailed in its size 
and flexibility to the benefit of proliferating EBFs:  
 
“Under the 1980- 93 fiscal contract system, the local governments controlled the 
effective tax rates and bases despite the fact that they did not have the authority to 
alter the statutory rates and bases. They offered varying degrees of tax concessions 
to enterprises and shifted budgetary funds to extrabudgetary funds, thus minimising 
tax sharing with central government.” (Ma and Norregaard, 1998: 4). 
 
2. Lacking transparency and accountability of EBFs poses risks to sound financial 
management: the literature on EBFs in Chinese local government records the significant 
aggregate costs connected to their proliferation.  Particularly in the earlier reform period 
up until the early 1990s, this was further compounded by the convergence of poorly 
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defined and enforced local taxation rights with ineffective, decentralised financial 
management. As a result, EBFs’ costs to sound financial management and fiscal policy in 
China fall mainly along the three dimensions as identified also by the IFI literature: 
 
• Fiscal discipline in terms of comprehensive budget expenditure control: Because 
EBFs also get used for conspicuous consumption expenditure – to public and 
private benefit alike – rather than investment, this can lead to distorted expansion 
in overall consumption expenditure and waste of funds. 
 
• Allocation of resources inconsistent with policy priorities: The allocation of 
resources consistent with policy priorities is impaired by local EBFs with respect 
to both efficient investment and redistribution. With large amounts of total fiscal 
revenue remaining outside regular budget management and „lacking cross-
regional coordination and careful management, (…) redundant construction and 
similar regional industrial structures lead to intensified competition between 
regions as well as waste of resources“ (Zhan, 2008: 5). With respect to the 
redistributive function of fiscal allocation, the tight budgetary situation of the 
central Chinese government (which is in large part due to the lack of control over 
EBFs) not only limits overall fiscal allocative flexibility but has impeded the 
installation of a sizeable intergovernmental fiscal equalisation programme, 
required to tackle dramatic regional disparities across China (Ma & Norregaard, 
1998: 8).  
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• Efficient and effective operational and cash management: Matching the 
expectations of IFI experts, misuse of and corruptive practices involving EBFs are 
widespread phenomena in Chinese local government to this day, despite sustained 
central government efforts against corruption, and budget reforms (Yang, 2004). 
Because EBFs used to be until recently collected and managed in a decentralised 
setting, many agencies were able to bypass institutional checks and manipulate 
funds to their personal economic benefit. Because of the absence of supervision, 
many government agencies have also exploited their power to the maximum, 
pursuing the so-called “three unruly actions” or “three disorders” - that is illicit 
charges, fines and apportionments – to raise all sorts of creative levies and 
charges, often in an excessive manner (Zhan, 2008: 5). Furthermore, many local 
governments in China for lack of centralised control underreport collected shared 
tax revenue levels and divert the resultant ‘surplus’ funds away from the regular 
budget into separate accounts, called “small coffers.” Needless to say, this illegal, 
unchecked practice imposes high costs on the Treasury. 
 
3. In the aggregate, EBFs pose serious risks to macro-fiscal policy in China: fiscal policy 
instruments risk being undermined by counterproductive use of local EBFs. For example, 
many local agencies keep EBFs to make loans directly to enterprises in circumvention of 
the official bank and credit system. Oi (1992: 121) remarks “these local government 
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IV.2.3 A brief chronology of Anti- EBF policy in China 
Extra-budgetary funds were originally established as a modest local extra-
budgetary revenue (EBR) supplement to the regular tax-based budgetary revenue 
comprising various kinds of local non-tax revenue.  
 
But since the onset of fiscal decentralisation in the early 1980s, EBFs expanded 
enormously both in numbers and funding levels; by the early 1990s they even surpassed 
the regular budgetary revenue in fiscal weight.19 EBFs’ resultant aggregate costs to the 
public purse as well as risks to prudent fiscal policy and sound financial management 
have prompted the Chinese government to reign in EBR growth and regulate and control 
local EBFs along with related corruptive practices (Zhan, 2009b). The following is a brief 
chronology of main central government interventions and budget system adjustments.  
 
In the first decade of the “second revolution”, up until the early 1990s central government 
was clearly concerned with the issue of proliferating EBFs and the aggregate costs they 
imposed on both public purse and governance. However, policy actions in this period 
lacked systematic nature and impact. For instance, as early as 1985 the government 
displayed its concern that the abuse of local EBR authority places an excessive fiscal 
burden on rural populations by stipulating that nontax levies on farmers should in total 
not exceed 5 % of their annual income – to little effect, however (Lu, 2000: 276).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  This historical fact about local EBF growth in China seems worth consideration by Egyptian policy 
makers as they prepare for comprehensive legal fiscal decentralisation reform in the near future. 	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From the early 1990s on, the centralised approach gained strategic consistency and focus, 
aiming at the elimination as well as budgetary consolidation of local special funds. In the 
context of violent protests in rural areas against the rising burden of excessive charges 
and levies related to EBFs, the first decisively effective central government action 
happened in 1993: local special fund collection from de-collectivised state-owned 
enterprises was stopped, and two systematic inspections of illicit administrative fees in 
local government agencies were conducted. As a result, EBR decreased to 37 % of the 
amount recorded in the previous year, 1992 (Zhan, 2008: 7).  
 
In 1995, the government issued a new set of local financial management and budgeting 
regulations. All surtaxes collected on the local level that used to belong to the extra-
budgetary fund category had to be integrated into the regular budget as of 1996. All other 
self-raised funds were to be placed comprehensively under extra-budgetary funds control 
(Lu, 2000: 283).20   
 
Another complementary move against EBFs dates to April 1996. Following a nationwide 
review of the collection and management of EBFs the “Decision on Strengthening the 
Management of Extra-Budgetary Fund” was issued, which eliminated 83 previously 
authorised administrative fees along with 13 government funds. Moreover, a number of 
local fees and levies were shifted from the extra-budgetary category to budgetary 
revenue. The Decision also reinforced the prohibition to transfer unreported local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  It took time, however, for these directives to materialise for real - as part of the budget reforms from 
1999	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budgetary revenue to the EBFs and required explicit approval by the State Council for the 
collection of local funds. (Zhan, 2008: 7n) 
 
From 1999, the institutional context and incentive system changed dramatically: The 
central Ministry of Finance spearheaded a comprehensive budget reform process in the 
aim to implement a more centralised, control-oriented modern public budgeting system. 
Its provisions with relevance to local EBFs mainly comprised the budgetary inclusion of 
departmental extra-budgetary funds down to the local level, the separation of revenue and 
spending for EBFs, the centralisation of expenditure management with a fiscal direct 
disbursement (FDD) system as well as the centralisation of government accounting 
services with the creation of a Treasury Single Account system (TSA) (Yang, 2004: 235 – 
248).21 The accumulated impact of these measures in terms of tightening financial 
management and fiscal control and empowering central and local finance bureaus 
contributed to the resolution of many a concern about the fiscal indiscipline surrounding 
local EBFs, as highlighted by Ma (2008) and Yang (2004).   
 
Worth special mention due to their centrality in gaining greater fiscal control over local 
EBFs are the two relatively simple but particularly effective measures of “Separating 
Revenue and Spending” (SRS) and “Separation of Bills and Money” (SBM) for EBFs. 
These effectively decoupled revenue and expenditure powers: Whereas before the 
authority for assessment, collection and spending had rested with the same agency with 
minimal supervision, agencies were now authorised only to assess and impose fines 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Note	  that	  this	  reform	  entailed	  a	  complete	  system	  overhaul	  within	  a	  matter	  of	  few	  years,	  which	  most	  remarkably	  included	  the	  nation-­‐wide	  implementation	  of	  zero-­‐based	  and	  itemised	  budgeting.	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(using payment bills issued by the finance bureau) while banks exclusively fulfil the 
collection function. The disbursement of funds for expenditure follows regular procedures 
and requires the approval by the local finance bureau22.  
 
It has been argued that one of the main purposes of this budget system reform was to 
centralise and strengthen budget control through the incorporation of EBFs into the 
regular budget and treasury accounting system, itself designed to prevent local agencies 
from impounding revenue. It is noteworthy that in order to incentivise actual compliance 
with the new control mechanisms of EBFs and the new legal requirement of budgetary 
consolidation, more adequate consumption expenditure allocations for operations and 
officials’ salaries were provided “in exchange” (Lu, 2000: 278; Lu, 1999: 358; Ma, 2008: 
127 - 130; Yang, 2004: 239n; Zhan, 2008: 8). Finally, another interesting ‘quid pro quo’ 
reform measure to gain control over EBFs in rural areas has been the “tax-for-fee” reform 
in 2002. It abolished a number of EBFs along with many financial obligations imposed on 
peasants; the resultant fiscal gap was filled by a moderate increase in rural tax rates.  
These measures constituted a compensatory arrangement by central government, designed 
to reduce extra-budgetary financial burden on peasants, and to shift the local fiscal burden 
toward the better regulated and supervised regular tax budget (Zhan, 2008: 8; Zhong, 
2003: 92). A final instructive observation on the 1999 budget reform process is that 
according to Yang (2004: 239 – 24a) all major reform measures have been piloted for 
periods between one and two years by selected provinces or ministries before the State 
Council approved their nation-wide endorsement.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Note	  however	  that	  while	  the	  success	  of	  these	  reform	  measures	  was	  remarkable	  it	  was	  not	  thorough	  (Zhan,	  2009b).	  
	   56	  
In conclusion of this brief chronological outline, the preliminary impact of Chinese local 
EBF reforms should be noted. As a consequence of the decisive budget reforms and other 
central government measures accompanied by strong enforcement vis-à-vis local 
officials, per capita EBR of most provinces plummeted in 1993 and 1998, and in some 
provinces also decreased in 2002. Since the 1999 reforms, EBR has been kept at a stable 
small fraction of regular budgetary revenue levels (although still rising in absolute 
terms).23 However, Zhan’s longitudinal and cross-sectional data analysis of EBR in China 
in the period between 1982 and 2003 shows that the impact of reforms has not been 
uniform across provinces with some localities’ EBR actually rising in this period. This 
irregularity has been found to be a function of political influence of local officials and the 
efficiency with which they put their EBFs to use for local economic development 
programmes – another empirical vindication for the political economy counterargument 
to international finance experts’ technical, fiscal budget control oriented reform focus. 
 
IV.3 Towards a local budgetary reform strategy: Transferrable policy advice 
Clearly, taken together, the more theoretical-generalist IFI literature on local EBFs 
and the literature on the Chinese experience with reforming local EBFs offer a number of 
important insights and lessons. This section sums up this chapter’s main findings in the 
form of seven reform policy guidelines deemed most relevant and transferrable to Egypt, 
as discussed in later sections. This broad budget control reform strategy for local EBFs is 
going to inform the subsequent application stage of this thesis research on reforming local 
EBFs in Egypt – that is to say, first, a SWOT analysis of local EBF governance system in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  cf. chart by Zhan, 2008: 27, figures post-2003 are not available. 	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Egypt, generally and second, the development of concrete policy options on how to 
reform the current LSDA budget process on the governorate administration level.  
1. As a mechanism for financing and programming local development, local extra-
budgetary funds can produce significant socio-economic benefits, and reform-
minded policy makers may want to consider taking immediate advantage of this 
insight, never mind the public finance “unorthodoxy” of such an approach. The 
Chinese experience dramatically highlights that even in the presence of 
widespread misuse of funds due to inadequate (albeit expanding) budgetary 
controls, economic and political benefits of the use of local EBFs for development 
can in fact outweigh costs to the public purse by far - if prudently managed and, 
ideally, only for a transitory period.  
2. However, it appears not advisable at all, neither in the short nor in the long-term, 
to ignore the urgent need to develop better budget controls for local EBFs and/or 
eliminate them before “things get out of hand”24 - as both sets of literature 
communicate. This is because first, local EBFs are normally both connected to 
underlying budget system failures and tend to reinforce them. Second, they have a 
tendency to proliferate and persist. Third, in the aggregate, local EBFs can impose 
not only significant macroeconomic costs and risks to the regular budget, but also 
intense costs and risks to state legitimacy, especially in poorer, rural areas as the 
peasant revolts in China in the early nineties illustrate (see also below, section 
V.1.2.4). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  As	  set	  out	  in	  section	  II.1,	  budget	  control	  is	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  effective	  weighted	  combination	  of	  three	  dimensions	  of	  budget	  control	  -­‐	  fiscal,	  political	  and	  public	  –,	  which	  in	  turn	  determines	  the	  effective	  impact	  on	  the	  local	  social	  welfare	  function	  of	  extrabudgetary	  funds.	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3. Reform measures directed against local EBFs and connected malpractices are 
unlikely to yield positive results unless they are carried out as part of a more 
comprehensive long-term budget reform strategy. Such is the clear message from 
China with which the most recent IFI literature strand on reforming EBFs concurs. 
As the Chinese central government did, reform-minded policy makers are advised 
to keep a keen eye on local EBFs as part of the overall budget and decentralisation 
reform process, seeking opportunities to enhance their pro-development use, to 
integrate them into the regular budget system or to eliminate them eventually, 
where feasible. Policy options as they arise should continuously be analysed in 
terms of the yardstick objective of the state, being local economic development, 
and in function of overall institutional capacity. 4. The consideration of political economy factors by policy makers is paramount to 
reforming local EBFs successfully. Much more than the IFI literature would have 
it, the message of the Chinese experience with controlling, merging, eliminating 
and consolidating local special funds is to focus on institutional incentive 
structures, developing quid pro quo elements in reform proposals for them to bode 
well. Consider, for example, that central government acquiescence to wasteful 
local EBF management is similar in effect to an informal fiscal transfer. Hence,	  if	  acquiescence	  is	  no	  longer	  to	  be	  the	  order	  of	  the	  day,	  compensation	  of	  another	  form	  will	  be	  required	  to	  ensure	  local	  compliance.	  This	  compensation	  can	  take	  multiple	   forms	   in	   China,	   monetary	   and	   party	   political.	   An	   instance	   of	  monetary	   compensation	   has	   been	   to	   provide	   more	   adequate	   consumption	  expenditure	   allocations	   for	   operations	   and	   officials’	   salaries,	   “in	   exchange”	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for	   actual	   compliance	   with	   newly	   introduced	   control	   mechanisms	   of	   local	  EBFs	  (cf.	  IV.2.3).	  	  5. Reform measures against illicit waste of funds connected to local EBFs will have 
no practical meaning unless explicitly, continuously and forcefully endorsed by 
top leadership. In China, accountability and scrutiny of local officials and their 
actions, if any, is first and foremost an intra-governmental affair chaired by central 
government.  The Chinese reform effort on this issue was rewarded because the 
government officially recognised the issue as a top priority and sent a clear 
message from the top down, that corruption and embezzlement in local 
administration including illicit EBF management practices are not tolerated – and 
especially not, if the respective local administration does not deliver on economic 
development targets.  China has cultivated this message through a long-term 
combination of anti-corruption mass mobilisation and institutional methods since 
the early 1980s: passing official resolutions and internal decrees, rounds of nation-
wide campaigns, engaging academia in studying local EBF phenomena, annual 
government anti-corruption meetings to designate reform tasks for the coming 
year, as well as selective, severe crackdowns on deviating local administrations 
involving the confiscation of large EBR sums (Lu, 1999, 363).	  
6. There is no quick fix to local EBFs, and visionary experimentation is essential to 
long-term reform success. Both sets of literature concur that the effort to gain 
greater budget control over local EBFs should be conceived of in phases, allow 
for experimentation and take account of interconnected legal, regulatory and 
administrative parameters for greater realism and feasibility. The Chinese 
experience is a shining example that small lessons learned today, can provide the 
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foundation for greater achievements and further lessons learned tomorrow. As 
noted under IV.2.3, in China, all major budget system reform measures, including 
those targeting budget control of local EBFs have been piloted for periods 
between one and two years by selected provinces or ministries before the central 
State Council approved nation-wide endorsement. 
7. Local citizen budget control is potentially less costly than fiscal and political 
budget control measures and should therefore be considered as part of a 
multipronged budget control reform effort. When devising local EBF reform 
measures, reform-minded policy makers likely to fare best when they 
pragmatically consider all three dimensions of budget control: fiscal, political and, 
not least, citizen budget control, in order to reach an optimal weighted 
combination of local budget control, in function of available administrative and 
financial resources.25 While the concept of ‘citizen budget control’ finds no 
explicit recognition in the antecedent IFI literature review, this lesson is a logical 
deduction from the evidence produced by the Chinese experience that budget 
control can only expand to the extent that capacities at any given point in time can 
support it.  Prudently tapping the citizen budget control capacity of local 
communities, in addition to central fiscal and political budget control reform 
measures, can enhance a central government’s ability to augment local budget 
control relatively faster and at lower cost, whilst supporting its larger local socio-
economic development and state legitimacy objectives. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  For	  an	  application	  of	  the	  concept	  to	  Egypt	  see	  chapter	  VI	  below,	  which	  develops	  near-­‐term	  reform	  measures	  to	  enhance	  all	  three	  budget	  control	  dimensions	  on	  the	  local	  administration	  level	  in	  Egypt	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V.  EXTRABUDGETARY FUNDS IN EGYPTIAN LOCAL ADMINISTRATION: 
AN ANALYSIS OF STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND 
THREATS 
 
The previous chapter has concluded on a set of highly relevant and potentially 
transferrable insights, as derived from the public finance literature and the country case 
study of local EBF reform in China. Together with our research premises,26 this budget 
control reform policy strategy is going to guide the remainder of this study on reforming 
local EBFs in Egypt: the SWOT analysis in Chapter V of the local EBF governance 
system and institutional incentive structure in Egypt; and - along with the results of the 
SWOT analysis - the development of concrete policy options in chapter VI on how to 
reform the current local services and development account (LSDA) budget structure and 





 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  These	  research	  premises	  have	  been	  set	  out	  in	  the	  conceptual	  outline	  (cf.	  section	  II.1)	  and	  are	  briefly	  recapitulated	  here:	  	  1. The	   effective	   weighted	   combination	   of	   the	   three	   dimensions	   of	   budget	   control-­‐	   fiscal,	  political	   and	   public	   budget	   control	   -­‐	   determines	   the	   effective	   risk	   to	   social	   welfare	   of	  extrabudgetary	  funds.	  2. Fiscal	   Control	   is	   not	   everything.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   sufficient	   political	   and	   public	   budget	  control,	  technical	  reforms	  will	  yield	  disappointing	  results.	  3. Reform	   proposals	   should	   be	  measured	   against	   a	   clear	   central	   government	   yardstick.	   This	  research	   assumes	   that	   the	   guiding	   reform	   objective	   in	   Egypt	   is	   to	   boost	   local	   economic	  development	  and,	  meanwhile,	  produce	  a	  positive	  popular	  legitimacy	  by-­‐effect.	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V.1 A brief legal and functional introduction to EBFs in Egypt 
Before proceeding to the SWOT analysis, a brief legal and functional introduction 
to the subject matter is expedient.  
As already noted in the introduction, Egypt remains one of the most centralised countries 
in the world, and local administrations are therefore highly constrained in their fiscal 
autonomy and local decision-making powers. Add to this a rigid, highly centralised top-
down budget planning and financial management system, and local needs-based 
development projects - along with the local economic growth these can produce – are 
systematically hampered.27   
 
A notable exception to local dependence on central government direction and general 
budget appropriation, however, is the legal provision for extrabudgetary funds on the 
local administration level, the local Special Funds and the local services and development 
accounts (LSDA). 28 These extrabudgetary funds (EBFs) permit localities to retain certain 
earmarked non-tax revenues like user charges and fines, voluntary contributions, as well 
as returns from revenue-generating projects and sale of public assets to finance own local 
expenditure programmes independently from the general budget.29   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  For	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  local	  (fiscal)	  administration	  system	  and	  budget	  planning	  system,	  cf.	  Appendix	  C	  28	  Originally	  established	  according	  to	  the	  local	  administration	  law	  No.	  43	  /	  1979	  as	  amended:	  Art.	  35	  –	  38	  (governorate	  level);Art.	  43	  (district	  level);	  Art	  51	  &	  53	  (town	  level);	  Art.	  69	  –	  71	  (village	  level);	  further	  decrees	  and	  executive	  regulations	  govern	  their	  diverse	  financial	  sources	  and	  uses	  across	  administrations.	  29	  Note	  that,	  in	  practice,	  these	  funds	  are	  not	  strictly	  speaking	  earmarked	  as	  explored	  further	  below	  under	  V.1.2.2;	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As such, the LSDA and Special Funds constitute the mechanism with which all sub-
national level administrations in Egypt are legally mandated to support public service 
levels and enhance local socio-economic development on a local priority needs basis. 
Their resources generally accrue entirely to the localities, which can autonomously decide 
over their use, and any account surplus including interest on savings does not revert to the 
central treasury at the end of the fiscal year, but instead gets carried forward (Local 
administration Law no 43/1976, Art. 36, 38). Besides these broad, common 
characteristics there are also important structural differences among local special funds 
and the LSDA: 
 
V.1.1.The local Special Funds 
Local special funds on the governorate level may be broadly categorised into two 
types: The first type are the plethora of local Special Funds linked to the deconcentrated 
local administration units (the so-called directorates) of the national service ministries, for 
instance in the areas of housing, health, education, transportation, tourism, youth and 
sports, veterinary medicine and agriculture (Abd El Mutallib El Ghanim, 2005: 30).   
The second type of local special funds concerns those linked by law to the governorate 
local administrations (generally called the Diwan). The main funds belonging into this 
category are the ‘economic housing fund’, the ‘land reclamation fund’ (established by art 
36 of law 43/1979), and the ‘cleaning fund’ (law 10/2005 amending law no. 30/1976). 
 
Egyptian law defines them as extrabudgetary Special Funds proper, i.e. their revenue 
stream, as defined by law, is in theory earmarked for their respective particular 
expenditure purpose, only. For example, garbage collection fees should be used to 
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enhance cleaning services, and nothing else (Art.1, law 10/2005). Further, it is 
noteworthy that the revenue streams, management and use of both types of local special 
funds can vary widely across Egyptian local administrations as, in addition to what is set 
down by law, each and every governorate administration can, and in most cases does, 
produce its own executive regulations governing each and every of the various local 
special funds in its jurisdiction (Diaa El Din, Personal communication, August 5, 2009).  
 
V.1.2 The LSDA 
The LSDA, by contrast to the earmarked special funds, can be established at every 
local administration level from the governorate down to the village (apart form the hayy 
level), and is considered an “independent” account (Sana’diq El-Mustaqila) as opposed to 
the local Special Funds (Sana’diq El-Khasa) described above (Abdel Wahab, Personal 
Communication, August 3, 2009), i.e. the LSDA funds may be budgeted and programmed 
autonomously by the localities, so long as they do not contradict the national general plan 
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The resources of the account - according to the law - should consist of  -­‐ Fees levied by the local popular council (LPC) of the respective local 
administration level within the limits of the rates and categories tabled in the 
ministerial decree 8/1976. The LPC may also introduce new levies or raise their 
level, a common practice.30 -­‐ Returns from revenue-generating projects31 -­‐ Donations, in-kind contributions, and bequests  -­‐ 50 % of the surplus collected above the general budget estimate (art. 37, law 
43/1979; art.1, decree 8/1976) 
 
On the defining extrabudgetary characteristics of the LSDA 
It has already been noted in the introduction and elaborated further in Appendix A that 
the LSDA are considered extra-budgetary hybrids by this research project: While they 
have the status of extrabudgetary funds in terms of actual financial management and 
budgetary process, their expenditure and revenue totals are in fact reported in the annual 
budget as total estimates, LSDA resources are treated by law as public funds and are 
subject to audit.32  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  For	  example:	  surcharges	  on	  cinema	  tickets,	  hotel	  stays,	  parking	  fees,	  road	  tolls,	  etc	  31	  For	  example:	  poultry	  collectives,	  milk	  production	  collectives,	  public	  gardens,	  etc.	  32	  That	  the	  LSDA	  budget	  plan	  by	  the	  LSDA	  committee	  does	  require	  approval	  (but	  may	  not	  be	  vetoed)	  by	  the	  respective	  Local	  Popular	  Council	  may	  be	  another	  reservation	  to	  their	  extrabudgetary	  nature.	  However,	   this	   research	  project	   concurs	  with	  Mayfield’s	   view	   that	   the	   local	   people’s	   councils	   at	   the	  local	   administration	   level	   are	   “part	   of	   the	   executive	   branch	   of	   government	   and	   therefore	   do	   not	  perform	  “legislative”	  functions,	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense	  of	  the	  word.”	  (Mayfield,	  1996:96)	  This	  means	  that	   there	   is	   no	   linkage	   to	   the	   Egyptian	   legislative	   budget	   appropriation	   process	   in	   a	   true	   sense,	  which	  renders	  the	  LSDA	  extrabudgetary	  on	  this	  account.	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The following lists five defining extrabudgetary characteristics of the LSDA in order to 
reinforce preceding justifications (cf. Appendix A) with more detailed information as to 
why they may be conceptualised and termed local EBFs:   
• A special committee (formed from among the members of the local administration 
unit to which it belongs) manages respective LSDAs. This LSDA committee 
exercises „suzerain power“ and is a separate special institutional unit, by virtue of 
legal authorisation by higher level government (min. decree 8/1976). 
• The LSDA funds may be budgeted and programmed autonomously by the local 
unit within a legally specified range of expenditure purposes. Within this range of 
expenditure purposes, the local unit to which the LSDA belongs exercises 
considerable digression and is not accountable to central government institutions 
on details of LSDA activity.  
• The LSDA are separate accounts (within the Treasury Single Account system) 
whose funds - including interest gained - accrue entirely to the local unit to which 
they belong and may not be diverted to the national treasury.  
• The sources of finance, which are specified for use to advance these specific 
expenditure purposes match those generally attributed to extrabudgetary funds and 
accounts: contributions, fees and user charges, sales of goods and services, sales 
of financial and non-financial assets, and general earmarked revenues33 (for a 
typology of EBFs’ sources of finance cf. Allen & Radev, 2006:14).  
• LSDA financial and budget management operates according to a process defined 
by ministerial decree, which runs independent from the regular annual budgetary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  A	  percentage	  of	  the	  surplus	  revenue	  collected	  above	  the	  general	  annual	  budget	  estimate	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process (according to decree 8/1976). That according to the Local Administration 
Law, the same scrutiny should apply to the LSDA as to all public funds does not 
fundamentally alter this core extra-budgetary characteristic.34  
 
V.1.3 The structure and distribution of local EBFs 
Resources of local special funds and of the LSDA are mostly concentrated on the 
governorate level.  The lower level administrations own very little local extrabudgetary 
resources; moreover, on the governorate administration level, the relative weight of total 
resources of special funds and accounts is considerably greater in the diwan than in the 
service directorates sector. El Shawy’s (2008:12) study of MoF data on local EBFs in the 
former pilot governorates35 shows that between 81 and 96 % of EBFs are concentrated in 
the diwan sector, leaving 4 - 19 % to the services directorates sector. 
 
Moreover, paralleling the Chinese experience, the extent to which extrabudgetary funds 
are exploited as an additional local development financing mechanism appears to depend 
much on the profile of the official(s) in charge, the administrative capacity as well as the 
effective tax base of the local unit (compare Zhan, 2009a). With an average of 35 L.E. per 
capita local EBR nation-wide, officially recorded per capita EBR differs widely between 
governorates, with 12 L.E per capita in Qena to 342 L.E. in Ismailia.  On the whole, 
governorate administrations and service ministry directorates alike are vulnerable to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  As	  explored	  in	  Appendix	  A,	  this	  has	  in	  fact	  come	  to	  be	  considered	  best	  practice	  in	  budget	  financial	  transparency:	  	  “Extrabudgetary	  activities	  should	  be	  identified	  in	  the	  annual	  budget	  or	  an	  annex	  to	  the	  budget.	  [They]	  should	  be	  subject	  to	  audit	  and	  should	  publish	  financial	  statements	  covering	  all	  inflows	  and	  outflows	  and,	  if	  relevant,	  the	  allocation	  and	  return	  on	  assets.”	  (IMF,	  2007:63)	  	  	  35	  Fayoum,	  Ismailia	  and	  Luxor	  until	  recently	  were	  recognised	  pilot	  governorates	  for	  decentralisation	  reform,	  before	  the	  GOE	  decided	  to	  have	  all	  governorates	  decentralise	  at	  once.	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charge of using special funds and accounts not as special local development funds but as 
a slush fund to pay for hospitality, amenities, and running costs like electricity and water 
bills.36 Yet again, note the significant variation between governorates: For example, 
Ismailia spends almost exclusively on current expenditure (only a margin of 1 % was 
expended on investment), while Luxor, quite the opposite, has invested the greater part of 
local own resources (65%) into capital expenditure (El Emam El Shawy, 2008). 
 
V.2  SWOT analysis of the local extrabudgetary governance system                        
The following SWOT analysis points out the main present strengths and 
weaknesses common to these local extrabudgetary funds in Egypt as well as (future) 
opportunities and threats inherent to this local financing mechanism - the latter with a 
particular reference to the outlook of the LSDA in the context of the decentralisation 
reform process. This assessment is conducted from the perspective of central Egyptian 
government and is meant to provide a meso-analytical conceptual framework (cf. table 
below) to inform the policy dialogue on how to enhance the developmental potential of 
local EBFs, while managing their risks to sound budget management. This assessment is 
then converted into concrete near-term reform policy recommendations in the next 
chapter, with a focus on the governorate-level LSDA budget structure and process.37  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  For	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  as	  discussed	  below,	  section	  V.2.2	  37	  On	  the	  rationale	  of	  this	  choice	  of	  reform	  case	  study	  please	  refer	  above	  to	  section	  III.3.1	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SWOT Analysis Chart: Extrabudgetary Funds in  
Egyptian Local Administration 
 
V.2.1 Strengths 
The two core strengths in the status quo of local EBFs are that, first, they 
compensate for budget system failures in the current governance system and second, this 
financial mechanism provides local administration with the budgetary authority and 
discretion to push for local needs-based development. 
 
Local EBFs compensate for budget system failures connected to Egypt’s historic 
centralism.  
Certainly, the most important strength of local EBFs is the extent to which they 
compensate for many budget system failures connected to Egypt’s historic centralism– of 
which they are similarly symptom and epitome (cf. below, under V.2.2, to ‘Weaknesses’). 
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Local EBFs are in effect the decentralised exception that proves the rule of centralisation 
in Egypt, providing the only official vehicle to receive local own-resources38 and to 
manage them autonomously from central government.  
 
The resultant myriads of local extrabudgetary funds help Egyptian local administrations 
address urgent local needs when they come up - without having to recur to the rigidly 
regulated and lengthy bureaucratic procedures governing disbursements from the general 
budget.  Local EBFs also enable localities to fulfil those most urgent needs, which the 
general budget planning process consistently fails to consider. Local EBFs also serve 
more generally to alleviate the negative social welfare effects of the chronic deficit in 
Egyptian local administration, compensating for financial shortfalls in general budget 
allocations and propping up meagre salaries. (Abdel Wahab, personal communication, 
August 3, 2009; El Emam El Shawy, 2008a: 1n; Sawy, personal communication, July 20, 
2009). 
 
EBFs provide local administrations with the required budgetary authority and 
discretion to push for local needs-based development.   
The other core strength of local EBFs is that local budgetary authority and considerable 
managerial flexibility is a major factor in the initiation and implementation of important 
local investment and service development projects in many governorates across Egypt. 
Famous examples for the impressive developmental results to be achieved with 
innovative local EBF management and skilled local infrastructure project planning are the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Mainly:	  earmarked	  local	  fees	  and	  fines,	  foreign	  grants,	  voluntary	  local	  contributions,	  self-­‐generated	  revenues	  from	  particular	  services	  and/or	  sale	  of	  public	  assets.	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administrations of governors Mahgoub and Labib in Alexandria, Labib’s earlier tenure in 
Qena governorate, and Governor El Baradei’s administration in Damietta (Bremer et al., 
2009).39 But there are many more, less so publicised and debated, smaller-scale local 
achievements in generating employment, and enhancing local socio-economic 
development across Egypt that crucially rely on local EBFs for their implementation. 
These prove that even relatively modest amounts of local own revenues can enable 
administrations to respond better to local needs than if they were to rely on central 
transfers only (Abdel Wahab, personal communication, August 3, 2009).40   
 
V.2.2 Weaknesses 
In assessing the current weaknesses of local EBFs in Egypt, it is important to 
differentiate between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ in order to avoid analytical confusion. The 
negative effects of underlying weaknesses in the structure and management of local EBFs 
are obvious: the lack of use, suboptimal use, “grey” use41 and the misuse of 
extrabudgetary funds that leads to lower than desired development outcomes at the 
Egyptian local administration level. The structural causes for these phenomena are 
another matter, presented here selectively for discussion:  Institutional fragmentation, 
limited local administration capacity, lack of internal and external transparency, and lack 
of top-down and bottom-up accountability. It is worth noting that at their core, these 
structural weaknesses of the local EBF governance system described here also pertain to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Providing	  detail	  on	  these	  experiences	  lies	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  research	  project;	  for	  further	  information	  please	  consult	  Bremer	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  40	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  introduction	  (chapter	  I),	  the	  volume	  of	  local	  EBFs	  equals	  about	  77	  %	  of	  total	  local	  capital	  expenditure	  in	  the	  FY	  2008/2009	  (cf.	  El	  Iman	  El	  Shawy,	  2008a:	  1n).  	  41	  “Grey”	  use	  refers	  to	  uses	  of	  EBFs	  that	  are	  compliant	  with	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law	  while	  violating	  its	  spirit	  and	  intent.	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aspects endemic to the overall financial management system in Egypt (compare IMF, 
2006). 
 
Institutional fragmentation and lack of clarity about what is permitted impede both 
budget control and a holistic approach to local development.  
As alluded to in our brief introduction to local EBFs in Egypt (Cf. section V.1), local 
special funds and accounts are not only copious but their structure in effect duplicates the 
sectoral fragmentation of central government on the local level (with the exception of the 
LSDA). This institutional fragmentation is one major issue impeding the productive 
investment of local special funds into local development projects, because it unduly 
complicates local financial management along with the practical task of project planning 
for local development. Moreover, it inhibits localities from adopting a wider than sectoral 
approach to local development: Many promising local development project ideas struggle 
to materialise simply because they transcend sectoral boundaries and do not fit with the 
expenditure requirements of (a) particular local special fund(s).  
 
Where special funds are instead “made to fit” the project in the interest of the local 
constituency, for example by spreading a non-authorised local investment project 
expenditure over a number of authorised expenditure categories of various funds, 
audacious administrations quickly find themselves operating in the legal grey zone 
(Abdel-Latif, personal communication, July 9, 2009). Moreover, there is lack of clarity as 
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to what is actually permitted/acquiesced to in the area of EBF management, further 
reinforced by strong ambiguity in regulatory enforcement.42  
The interpretative leeway thus enjoyed by individual administrations is effectively a 
function of their strategic value and senior officials’ political clout. It is the citizens of the 
less daring, less knowledgeable and less connected local administrations who ultimately 
loose out due to institutional fragmentation and to the opaque complexity of EBF rules 
and regulations - rendering the current system ineffective and highly inequitable in terms 
of local development outcomes. 
 
Limited local administration capacity in managing EBFs is an important obstacle to 
local improvement.  
Another point of weakness in the local EBF system at present is shortcomings in the 
capacity of many local administrations to identify and develop their own projects. They 
lack appropriate needs-assessment and implementation guidelines and they lack the 
technical know-how to maximize the developmental potential of the resources at their 
disposal (Abdel-Latif, personal communication, July 9, 2009).  
 
One example in point are the master plans for small cities and villages in Egypt 
developed locally with the support by the General Organisation of Physical Planning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  According	  to	  anecdotal	  evidence,	  a	  former	  mid-­‐level	  government	  official	  (chief	  of	  quarter	  in	  Port	  Said)	  was	  dismissed	  dishonourably	  from	  public	  office	  13	  years	  after	  he	  had	  unwittingly	  misaccounted	  for	  a	  	  LE	  50	  petrol	  expenditure	  for	  driving	  central	  government	  visitors	  (Sawy,	  personal	  communication,	  July	  20,	  2009)	  -­‐	  clearly	  a	  minor	  offence	  compared	  to	  what	  normally	  goes	  without	  reprimand.,	  but	  illustrating	  the	  potential	  vulnerability	  of	  local	  officials	  who	  find	  themselves	  out	  of	  favour.	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(GOPP)43 and UNHABITAT. In five years, practically none of these locally identified 
and centrally endorsed developmental priorities have materialised due in particular to the 
lack of capacity of governorate executive councils to convert defined local needs into 
concerted, locally financed action (Shalaan, personal communication, August 3, 2009). 
 
Lack of internal and external transparency impedes budget control over local 
development outcomes.  
Pervasive lack of transparency44 in Egyptian local EBF management may be considered 
another prime cause in accounting for unsatisfactory developmental outcomes. 
Detrimental to budget control in all its dimensions – fiscal, political and citizen -, lack of 
transparency on financial information invites officials to use grey, suboptimal and 
inappropriate mechanisms in managing local resources. The following explores internal 
and external transparency weaknesses in the Egyptian local EBF system in turn. 
 
Internal transparency is particularly important for both fiscal budget control and political 
budget control. For fiscal control, transparency enables the monitoring and audit 
functions of the MoF and thus provides an incentive to fidelity and appropriate 
management of local EBFs.  For political budget control, transparency permits tracking 
and evaluation of how localities are implementing political objectives, learning from local 
achievements and failures, developing best practice guidelines for local administrations, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  GOPP	  is	  the	  central	  state	  authority	  responsible	  for	  physical	  planning	  policy	  	  44	   ‘Transparency’	   in	   this	   context	   refers	   to	   unrestricted	   access	   for	   natural	   and	   legal	   persons	   to	  accurate,	   complete	   and	   intelligible	   information	   on	   a	   matter	   of	   public	   interest;	   it	   is	   considered	  fundamental	   to	   all	   dimensions	   of	   budget	   control,	   fiscal,	   political	   and	   citizen	   alike.	   Internal	  transparency	   refers	   to	   transparency	   within	   the	   state	   administration,	   particularly	   transparency	  between	   local	   and	   central	   government	   entities.	   External	   transparency	   refers	   to	   transparency	  between	  the	  state	  administration	  and	  the	  citizenry.	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and reprimanding those officials who deliberately trespass the line where local predation 
crowds out local development.  
 
Significant headway has recently been made in terms of internal transparency and cash 
management thanks to the establishment of a Treasury Single Account (TSA) system and 
the incorporation of most local special accounts into it via zero-accounts45. Presidential 
decree no.139/2006 amending Law 127/1981 on local accountability makes it illegal to 
maintain unconsolidated subaccounts at the local level and to withhold local resources 
outside the TSA.46  
 
Nevertheless, beyond the volume of local special funds and accounts deposited in the 
TSA, the central GOE recognizes its highly limited knowledge about the budgets of local 
special funds and LSDA. The MoF receives financial information on local administration 
revenue and expenditure only in the “super-aggregate” and has no information about the 
details of local EBF project accounts. Unable to verify the accuracy of local budgets, it 
therefore lacks adequate data to exercise its financial budget control function, which 
includes the tracking of funds’ use, identification of best practices in revenue generation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  	  The	  establishment	  of	  a	  TSA	  system	  is	  an	  integral	  element	  in	  public	  financial	  management	  reform	  and	  aims	   for	   the	  centralisation	  and	   improvement	  of	  cash	  management.	  A	   treasury	  single	  account	   is	  opened	   at	   the	   central	   bank,	  which	   should	   include	   all	   formerly	   separate	   accounts	   belonging	   to	   any	  government	   entity	   including	   local	   administrative	   units.	   	   In	   this	   context,	   zero	   accounts	   (whose	  establishment	  must	  be	  authorised	  by	   the	  MoF)	  are	  accounts	  of	   government	  entities	  at	  banks	  other	  than	   the	  central	  bank.	  Their	  balance	   is	   remitted	  daily	   to	  parallel	  accounts	   in	   the	  TSA	  at	   the	  central	  bank.	  Banks,	  which	  have	  zero	  accounts	  are	  authorised	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  TSA	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  	  zero	  account	  balance.	  46	  About	   3000	   accounts	   have	   been	   incorporated,	  with	   the	   exception	   of	   local	   special	   fund	   accounts	  linked	  to	  the	  education	  sector.	  After	  initial	  technical	  capacity	  issues	  the	  system	  is	  now	  running	  well,	  according	   to	   most	   interviewees.	   Higher	   interest	   rates	   accruing	   to	   local	   units	   constitute	   a	   major	  compliance	   incentive.	  Most	  constituencies	  receive	   the	  actual	   time	  deposit	   rate	   (about	  6	  %)	  now,	  as	  opposed	  to	  2-­‐3	  %	  local	  bank	  interest	  under	  the	  previous	  system.	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and expenditure for replication and/or potentially acting against the more blatant misuses 
of funds (Diaa el Din, personal communication August 5, 2009).47  
 
Contributing to this internal fiscal transparency weakness is the fact that certain 
transactions are automatically exempted from fiscal reporting requirements.  To be sure, 
according to law 9/1981, all purchases with public money must be accounted for in the 
local budget. However, the law gives room for the definition by circular of authorized 
expenditure ceilings, below which local expenditures need not be reported.48 These 
authorized ceilings can reach considerable levels, up to about 20- 25,000 L.E. for the 
governorate administration level. Avoiding the fiscal reporting of even substantial 
expenditure programmes hence becomes a facile, technical matter, by splitting expenses 
into appropriate categories (Sawy, personal communication, July 20, 2009).   
 
Moreover, local in-kind contributions, such as building material and labour, are in general 
outright exempt from fiscal reporting, because the budgeting system is cash-based. This 
exemption shrouds from view the actual level of local community and business 
contributions - which in many parts may be rather significant - along with information on 
who is ultimately bearing the costs and reaping the benefits of local development projects, 
and how achievements were accomplished in a particular local constituency over time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	   	  A	  case	   in	  point	   for	  developmentally	  harmful	  misuse	  of	   resources	   is	  Assiut,	  which	   together	  with	  Sohag	  has	  the	  highest	  concentration	  of	  poverty	   in	  Egypt	  and	  is	  known	  for	   its	  security	  troubles.	  The	  governor	  preferred	  to	  waste	  most	  funds	  on	  the	  outer	  embellishment	  of	  the	  city	  rather	  than	  investing	  into	  vital	  basic	  infrastructure	  development	  such	  as	  running	  water	  –	  an	  urgent	  developmental	  priority	  in	  Assiut.	  48	   These	   are	   defined	   by	   circular	   on	   an	   ongoing	   basis.	   Current	   average	   exemption	   ceilings	   are	  estimated	  to	  be	  500	  LE.	  For	  the	  village	  level,	  2000-­‐	  5000	  LE	  on	  the	  quarter	  level,	  about	  10.000	  LE	  for	  the	  city,	  and	  finally,	  20.000-­‐	  25.000	  L.E.	  on	  the	  governorate	  level.	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External transparency on local extrabudgetary fund management, i.e. the provision of 
public information to citizens, is the most basic condition in developing citizen budget 
control. In Egypt, however, where little, if any information at all, is available to local 
constituents, citizens are effectively barred from assuming their role in developing greater 
budget control for better and more equitable development outcomes. Absent any public 
information on EBF revenue and expenditures, local citizens are unable to establish a link 
between their financial contributions and their uses,49 let alone to evaluate the 
performance of and the fidelity to rules and norms of sound financial management of their 
local administrators.  Also, with budget processes completely shrouded from public view, 
local stakeholders are inhibited from following or participating in the identification, 
development and cost-benefit assessment of local development projects.50 
 
The lack of top-down and bottom-up accountability mechanisms acts as a strong 
disincentive to further local development.  
Due to missing top-down and bottom-up accountability mechanisms, local special funds 
and LSDA are effectively under sole control of the head of the local administration unit to 
which they belong. This official consequently has considerable discretion at using local 
EBFs, regardless of the particular legally prescribed institutional structure (Sawy, 
personal communication, July 20, 2009). It goes without saying that such institutional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  The	  collection	  of	  fees	  and	  fines	  by	  local	  authorities	  is	  not	  standardised,	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  fund	  and	  the	   administration	   in	   question;	   hence,	   what	   percentage	   of	   the	  money	   goes	  where	   remains	   hidden	  from	  the	  average	  citizen.	  For	  example,	  parking	  fees	  are	  collected	  by	  traffic	  authority,	  and	  then	  go	  in	  part	  to	  the	  tourism	  and/	  or	  road	  maintenance	  authority.	  50	   It is noteworthy that the transparency record in China is also – if not equally - poor. However, central 
government has compensated for this lack of transparency to an important extent by engaging academic 
research in collecting and analyzing data across local administrations, producing a considerable and still 
growing body of knowledge on the nature and uses of local EBFs that informs political budget control and 
reform policies to enhance fiscal budget control.  	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setups provide a formidable incentive to officials to manage local EBFs outside their legal 
mandate.   
 
Systemic exceptionalism and non-standardisation of extrabudgetary structures and 
procedures across local administrations in Egypt means that technical top-down and 
bottom-up accountability mechanisms are elusive at present, as the following quote 
indicates:  
“Any non-standard local special fund structure is in theory [emphasis added] 
written into by-laws and approved by the ministry of finance, which keeps 
record of them. But the sheer volume and diversity of these by-laws means 
they are of little use.” (Diaa El Din, personal communication, August 5, 
2009) 
 
But also political top-down and bottom-up accountability in terms of local 
administrations’ overall performance on developmental deliverables fall short, for several 
reasons.  First, the officials in charge of managing local EBFs (as well as the general local 
budget) are not elected but are rather appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the central 
GOE; thus, any formal bottom-up accountability link is severed. Informal bottom-up 
accountability, too, is marginal, given the lack of transparency described in the previous 
section. Second, regarding top-down accountability, there is no evidence available 
indicating that senior officials, namely governors, are bound to or evaluated against any 
particular local economic development targets set by central government for their period 
in office.  
 
This implies that the current local EBF chaos lacks even indirect, results-oriented 
accountability mechanisms that have proven crucial to the enviable local development 
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record of China (cf. IV.2.1.2). In short, in Egypt there is little to force officials to work 
for the realisation of local development projects. To the contrary, they get “rewarded” 




The medium- to long-term opportunities presented by local EBFs (assuming that 
fiscal decentralisation reforms take off in Egypt) are at least as impressive as current 
weaknesses in Egyptian local own-resource management.  This section argues that first, 
local EBFs present the opportunity to reach a new level of needs-based local development 
and state legitimacy in Egypt; second, they represent an ideal testing ground for 
decentralisation reforms and the best vehicle available to start now to build up local social 
and human capital assets for the future. 
 
Local EBFs present the opportunity to reach a new level of needs-based local 
development and state legitimacy in Egypt.  
We have already noted the major strength of local EBFs in that they provide local 
administrations with the budgetary authority and discretion they require to push for local 
needs-based development. Local administrations will use this power if they are 
developmentalist, knowledgeable, resourceful, and well connected. But the 
developmentalist potential of local EBFs can (and should) be exploited to the maximum 
everywhere in Egypt, provided the current institutional incentive system governing their 
use is adapted to reduce structural weaknesses.  
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One opportunity to foster this outcome is to streamline the fragmented local EBF system 
both legally and structurally and to merge functionally complementary local special 
funds. Such a reform would render local use of extrabudgetary funds more manageable 
and more transparent. Another less laborious medium-term option would be to provide 
local administrations with a comprehensive body of guidance to assist them in 
identifying, budgeting and implementing local projects. A “going by the book” can enable 
all local administrations, even the less knowledgeable and less well connected, to fulfil 
their legal mandate and deliver more and better public services and development to their 
constituencies.   
 
Greater local achievements in delivering public goods and development can in turn 
strengthen popular legitimacy, which is fundamentally based on the state’s ability to 
deliver public goods. Local administrations are the agents of the central state; hence, the 
deliverables they are enabled and required to achieve are going to reflect positively on the 
GOE as a whole. Including the local citizenry in local development can add on further to 
legitimacy.  
 
Local EBFs represent an ideal testing ground for decentralisation reforms and a 
promising local building site for social and human capital.  
Local EBF reforms offer to the GOE a tremendous opportunity, by virtue of being an 
ideal experimental testing ground in the run-up to decentralisation reforms. By definition, 
local extrabudgetary funds are fairly isolated from the wider governance system including 
the central budget system and thus can be reformed or adapted with considerable 
flexibility and speed: by decree. It can be argued that experimenting with local fiscal 
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administration reforms in comparable pilot constituencies could provide information 
about “what works and what doesn’t”, providing invaluable clues as to the optimal future 
institutional design under a progressively decentralising governance system.  
 
Such experimental reform policy options are numerous: Particular special funds and their 
functional activities might, for example, receive targeted support from central government 
to enhance their performance and later expand their responsibilities commensurate with 
growing funding and capacity levels. Some functional special funds belonging to the 
service directorates may be prepared to “graduate” for spin-off to become part of the set 
of expenditure functions of the relevant local administration. Another option may be to 
single out a local EBF to develop and test progressive budgeting methods like programme 
or performance budgeting. Certain local EBFs may lend themselves to making 
incremental, cumulative changes in the accountability mechanisms governing them  
(compare Abd al Muttalib al Ghanim, 2005: 31). Finally, local EBFs may be considered 
the best available vehicle to start building up local human and social capital now.51 The 
involvement, even inclusion of the local citizenry in decision-making through 
participatory budgeting tools can contribute significantly to local human and social 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  ``social capital . . . refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can 
improve the effciency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.'' (Putnam, 1993:167) 	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V.2.4  Threats 
As we have seen, the future opportunities inherent to the local extrabudgetary 
financing mechanisms in Egypt and their evolution and /or adaptation are indeed 
promising. However, the potential future threats to the central GOE posed by local EBFs 
are equally real, as already explored in general as part of the literature review (cf. sections 
IV.1.2 and IV.2.2). This section highlights three main risks found to be of particular 
relevance to Egypt as the GOE prepares for rapid fiscal decentralisation as China once did 
back in the late 1970s: First, the tendency of EBFs to proliferate and diversify; second, 
impaired ability to pursue other reforms resulting from institutionalizing extrabudgetary 
exceptionalism; third, a threat to state legitimacy if all their negative side-effects remain 
unaddressed. 
 
Local EBFs have a tendency to proliferate and diversify, putting a strain on the budget 
system. Such proliferation and diversification is empirical fact, and becomes worse when 
the issue is overlooked by central government in times of rapid structural change. This in 
turn can have deleterious aggregate impact on the budget system, creating common pool 
problems like overgrazing of local tax bases, particularly in poorer areas. If the GOE is 
really set to pursue a reform path of rapid fiscal decentralisation, it would be well-advised 
to consider carefully China’s salutary experience with the onset of rapid fiscal 
decentralisation, and strategically prepare for such future risks. 
 
In China, there had been a fairly stable, modest volume of EBFs in China all along, but 
once fiscal decentralisation started in the 1980s, the volume of extrabudgetary revenue 
expanded so rapidly that by the early 1990s it even exceeded general budget revenues.  
	   83	  
This development in China was compounded by the convergence of poorly defined and 
enforced local taxation rights with ineffective, decentralised financial management. 
Needless to say, this imposed massive costs on the central treasury and impeded budget 
management, fiscal analysis, and policy implementation. It took about a decade of serious 
central government action to bring the issue of proliferating local EBFs under relative 
control again- a costly experience, indeed, which the GOE should do its best to avoid. 
 
Permanent local extrabudgetary exceptionalism endangers reforms in related areas. 
Permanent, wholly uncontrolled extrabudgetary exceptionalism risks distorting and/or 
slowing down reforms in Egyptian local fiscal administration along with reforms of 
related elements in the budget system (cash management, budget planning and fiscal 
equalisation measures, for example). By definition antithetical to budgetary transparency, 
accountability, and streamlining, local EBFs represent a powerful institutional incentive 
to non-compliance, which – left wholly unchecked – can create harmful institutional path 
dependencies. It would be unreasonable to expect, that if local officials may bypass 
institutional checks, underreport and manipulate local finances in one area without having 
to fear for the worst, this would not spill over into other areas of the local budget 
system.52 Hence, local EBFs should either be brought into the light or, if they are to 
remain a hidden but tolerated variable in the budget reform function, they should be kept 
as small as possible. To do otherwise would be to put future decentralisation reforms at 
disproportionate risk. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  This	  expectation	  is	  congruent	  with	  China’s	  experience	  (Zhan,	  2009b)	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Local EBFs can become a real threat to internal and external state legitimacy.  
As China’s experience warns, proliferating local EBFs can become a threat to state 
legitimacy at both the internal (local-to-central government) and external (government-to-
citizen) level. Internally, the central government risks losing control over local 
administrations as the latter build autonomous fiscal resources that they can effectively 
keep independent from compliance with central political directives. Externally, growing 
levies without apparent local benefit can arouse public discontent to the extent that local 
EBFs may become a source of social contention and unrest, especially in poorer rural 
areas. A deterrent example for this can be seen in the peasant revolts in China in the 
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VI. APPLIED CASE STUDY: REFORMING GOVERNORATE-LEVEL 
LOCAL SERVICES AND DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT 
 
The reform policy guidelines as derived from the critical comparison of insights 
from the Chinese experience with the policy advice of international public finance experts 
(section IV.3), and the preceding general SWOT analysis of local EBFs in Egypt (chapter 
V) inform the following proposal of short-term reform policy options for the governorate-
level LSDAs.53 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate possible ways, in which the preceding SWOT 
analysis can be translated into concrete policy action by the GOE in the system as is, 
independent of any changes in the overall budget system of Egypt. Thus, the objective of 
following reform proposals is to illustrate how fairly limited changes by decree can help 
reduce current weaknesses in local extrabudgetary account management (as defined 
above), and to capitalise on its strengths as the only mechanism available at present to 
boost comprehensive local needs-based development.  At the same time, by presenting an 
array of short-term options without pre-imposed prioritisation, we invite policy makers to 
discuss the nature of and experiment with building the “right” local institutional 
foundation for upcoming decentralisation and budget reforms in Egypt.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  As	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  above	  (section	  III.3.1,),	  the	  governorate-­‐level	  LSDA	  has	  been	  chosen	  as	  the	  specific	  reform	  case	  study,	  because	  it	  is	  the	  only	  type	  of	  local	  EBF	  with	  a	  clear	  uniform	  legal	  basis	  across	  all	  local	  administrations	  and	  administration	  levels	  in	  Egypt.	  Hence,	  focussing	  exclusively	  on	  the	  LSDA	  in	  the	  implementation	  discussion	  can	  provide	  the	  analysis	  with	  greater	  depth	  without	  sacrificing	  wider	  applicability	  of	  proposed	  reform	  policy	  options.	  Moreover,	  because	  LSDA	  funds	  are	  mainly	  concentrated	  on	  the	  governorate	  level,	  and	  can	  be	  used	  “independently”	  for	  all	  types	  of	  expenditure,	  reform	  in	  this	  area	  promises	  the	  most	  certain	  reward	  in	  terms	  of	  swift	  local	  development	  outcomes	  from	  short-­‐term	  local	  EBF	  reform.	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The following is a problem-oriented, legal-regulatory analysis of the LSDA revenue and 
expenditure structure and of three crucial stages in the LSDA budget process. Focussing 
on ‘policy deliberation and budget preparation’, ‘budget authorisation’, and ‘budget 
monitoring and evaluation’, we propose reform policy options to tackle the core issues 
such defined, and present a brief implementation risk assessment for each reform policy 
area. 
 
V.1 A problem-oriented analysis of the LSDA structure and budget process:  
       Some issues and reform options  
What follows is a legal, issue-focussed analysis of first, the LSDA revenue and 
expenditure structure and second, of crucial junctures in the budget process. Tracking 
three crucial stages in the LSDA budget cycle as defined by law - ‘policy deliberation and 
budget preparation’, ‘budget authorisation’, and ‘budget monitoring and evaluation’ - we 
propose reform policy options and provide a brief implementation risk assessment for 
each.  
 
The proposed reform measures put primary focus on enhancing citizen budget control 
rather than fiscal and political budget control because this is the stage in the process 
where the local constituencies can be most involved in setting the objectives for LSDA 
expenditure, thus promoting more transparent local investment into needs-based 
development. According to the senior ministerial advisor on EBFs, the Egyptian MoF 
recognises that under the current situation it cannot (in terms of capacity) and need not (in 
terms of respecting local authority over development) exercise greater control over the 
local own-revenue project budgets. Instead, establishing greater accountability of local 
	   87	  
officials towards their respective constituency is thought to provide the solution (Diaa El 
Din, personal communication, August 5, 2009). Thus, the recurrent theme running 
through this local EBF reform policy case study is the ambition to improve accountability 
and transparency in the current institutional setup of LSDA budget management to enable 
greater citizen budget control for better local development outcomes.54  
 
There is but one important contextual precondition to the feasibility and realism of our 
subsequent short-term reform propositions for the governorate LSDA: If, like in China, 
the Egypt’s main goal is to drive equitable local economic development and enhance 
local state legitimacy then, as in China, Egypt’s senior appointed officials in local 
administration need to be made accountable for their local reform and development 
record by the top executive levels of the GOE, whether by formal or informal means. As 
China’s experience demonstrates, strong top-down accountability of appointed central 
government officials is central to producing real change on the ground in a highly 
centralised, autocratic governance system. The proposition is not far-fetched55 that 
governors should be bound to and evaluated against economic development targets set by 
the GOE executive for their period in office in a way that affects their future career and 
puts a firm example to their peers. Without such strong political economy incentive from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	   I.e.,	   increasing	   local	   citizens’	   ability	   to	   influence	   and	  monitor	   the	   appropriate	   spending	   of	   their	  contributions	  to	  the	  LSDA	  and	  the	  fidelity	  of	  officials	  to	  the	  formal	  rules	  and	  regulations	  on	  handling	  
these local public funds. Introducing civic engagement into the general LSDA budget management process 
can raise public budget control significantly. To this aim, the installation of elements of participatory 
budgeting (PB) and participatory public expenditure management (PPEM) is considered the best means 
available.	  55	  Note Art. 29- bis, local administration law 43/1979 as amended (added by law 50/1981): “the governor 
shall be held responsible before the PM for practicing his competences.” 	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above, there seems to be little to force officials to work toward the realisation of local 
development projects from below, by participatory or any other means (cf. also V.2.2). 
 
V.1.1  Expenditure 
Legal provision 
The legal provision on the “use of the resources of the local services and development 
account” states that LSDAs have another legally mandated use next to local development 
and upgrading of public services:56 “the completing of projects provided for in the general 
plan for which the financial allotments in the governorate budget do not suffice for their 
execution.” (Min. decr. no. 8/1976: Ch. 2, art 2, and § 1b, translated by the author). 
 
Issue 
This may make sense if the objective of the LSDA is simply expenditure compensation 
for budget system failures. However, if the overarching policy objective is local 
development (cf. II.1), then this clause defeats the desired purpose of the LSDA as a 
financing mechanism exclusively for local development investment projects. For one, 
because it defies the benefit principle that justifies local EBFs (IV.1.1.1) in theory, and 
secondly, in practice, it remains open to interpretation by local officials if and when 
general budget apportionments are insufficient. It hence invites the currently observed 
excessive local current expenditure from the governorate LSDA to prop up regular local 
administration operations and salaries (cf. V.2.2). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  I.e.,	  “the	  making	  of	  revenue	  generating	  projects	  and	  local	  services(…)	  funding	  of	  projects	  that	  are	  carried	   out	   with	   self-­‐efforts,	   raising	   the	   level	   of	   performance	   of	   general	   local	   services(…	   and)	  spending	  on	  basic	  public	  services”	  (	  chapter	  2,	  art	  2,	  §1)	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Recommended policy options 
To avoid that LSDA resources continue to be wasted as slush funds, policy makers should 
consider closing this legal loophole, to match the distinctly local character of the 
account’s revenues with a new, exclusively local character of LSDA expenditures, and to 
eliminate room for local interpretation of where central government budget 
apportionments are “insufficient”.  
 
The intuitive policy recommendation would be to abolish/cancel this provision outright 
(Sawy, Ali personal communication, July 20, 2009). However, such a move would ignore 
the fact that the general budget system does suffer from important limitations so that 
project allocations are more often than not off target. Unless this wider systemic issue is 
addressed in the medium-to long-term as part of a comprehensive budget reform strategy 
of the GOE, there is little use in barring local administrations from covering loose ends in 
centrally conceived and financed local projects where deemed appropriate, even if this 
risks wasting local contributions on current expenditure outside the local budgeting 
authority.  
 
Rather, the immediate concern should be to curtail the use of the LSDA as a slush fund in 
the short-term. It is recommended to set a generic LSDA expenditure ceiling on 
supporting regular, central government projects and operations. This ceiling should be 
negotiated between the governorates and the MoF and the MoED in order to ensure 
reasonability and feasibility. This ceiling may then be phased downwards in congruence 
with advances in the general budget planning process.  
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Implementation risk assessment 
The risk is that, whatever ceiling is agreed upon may not be implemented as envisioned 
but rather provide an incentive to local officials to remove LSDA account management 
further from central government sight. Already the MoF’s fiscal budget control over the 
governorate budget along with the LSDA is remarkably low, with revenues and 
expenditures only listed in the “super-aggregate” with often patently incomplete or 
inaccurate budget reporting (cf. above, V.2.2). This is why this policy reform is unlikely 
to have desired effects without the parallel implementation of successful complementary 
policy reforms for greater local public budget control (cf. below). 
 
V.1.2  Revenue 
Legal provision 
According to the law, a major part of financial resources of the LSDA consists of fees 
levied by the local popular council (LPC) of the respective local administration level 
within the limits of the rates and categories tabled in the appendix of ministerial decree 
8/1976. The LPC may raise their level and may even introduce new charges (according to 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	   That	   is,	   of	   course,	   in	   addition	   to:	   returns	   from	   revenue-­‐generating	   projects,	   Donations,	   in-­‐kind	  contributions,	  and	  bequests;	  50	  %	  of	  the	  surplus	  collected	  above	  the	  general	  budget	  estimate	  (art.	  37,	  law	  43/1979;	  art.1,	  decree	  8/1976)	  (cf.4.1.1.2);	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Issues 
Authorised categories of local own revenue apart from extra-charges on hotel fees and 
cinema tickets are heavily focussed on the agricultural sector, and due to its datedness, the 
catalogue does not take account of potential local sources of local development finance 
under the current conditions of a much more urbanised Egypt, nor does it take account of 
depreciation. At the same time, not all governorate LSDA committees and LPCs are 
equally capable and audacious to study and pass higher or new levies commensurate with 
changed local conditions, even if they are authorised to do so by law. Hence certain fees 
have even become veritable “nuisance fees” since their introduction in the late 1970s 
whereby collection is more costly than revenue gained. Some governorates even outright 
prefer to do without them, and instead siphon off a percentage of other governorate level 
special funds, such as the cleaning and the housing fund (Habiba Eid, personal 
communication, July 16, 2009). As a result, the level of available LSDA resources for 
enhancing local development is highly inequitable across the nation and local revenue 
generation may fall disproportionately on certain local groups over others, while some 
LSDAs rely heavily on (quasi-) unlawful sources. 
  
Recommended reform policy option 
It is therefore recommended that the MoLD endorse an updated catalogue of authorised 
categories of fees and charges that brings contemporary practice and law back into line. 
This catalogue should be based on a nation-wide study, taking into consideration the 
evolution and diversification of LSDA revenue structures as well as the depreciation of 
the Egyptian Pound since the late 1970s when the catalogue was decreed. In order not to 
repeat the latter mistake, defined ceilings in this catalogue should be expressed in 
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percentage per unit rather than absolute monetary terms so that the guidelines keep their 
validity independent from currency fluctuations. Such a catalogue could even provide the 
basis for outlawing special fund diversions towards the LSDA in the medium term. 
 
Implementation risk assessment 
It is a known that local administrations guard the exact details of their LSDA revenue 
generation like a secret from central government. This likely is an important obstacle in 
the way of achieving a comprehensive overview over the different practices in LSDA 
revenue generation to inform an updated, streamlined base catalogue of authorised levies. 
At a minimum, local administrations should therefore be guaranteed indemnity from 
persecution, in case the more creative revenues run counter to current rules and 
regulations.    
 
V.1.3  Policy Deliberation and Budget Preparation 
Three shortcomings in the “policy deliberation and budget preparation” element of 
the LSDA budget process deserve particular attention by reform- and experimentation- 
minded policy makers: first, the oligopolistic setup of the governorate LSDA committee; 
second, irregular, closed deliberation on LSDA policy, projects and performance; and 
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1. On the LSDA decision-making authority: Combating oligopolistic management 
structures 
 
Legal provision:  
Chapter 3 of the ministerial decree number 8/1976 states that on the governorate local 
administration level, a committee is to be formed composed of  
• The governor (acting as chair of the LSDA committee),  
• General secretary of the governorate,  
• One member of the local popular council (chosen by the committee itself),  
• The head of the finance directorate,  
• Head of planning and follow-up,  
• Head of budgeting and  
• The head of the village construction and development agency  
 
The committee is to function as the “suzerain power”(Min. decr. no. 8/1976: ch.3, art. 3, § 
1.2) in setting the objectives, administration and political direction of the LSDA and “the 
chief of the committee (i.e. the governor) is in charge of the execution of the decisions of 
committee and the management of its objectives in accordance with the rules set for this 
by the committee.” (Min. decr. no. 8/1976: ch.3, art. 3, § 1.3) 58 
 
Issue 
As is legally defined, the LSDA committee’s composition, narrow membership, its 
suzerain authority over all areas of budget management, and the paramount role assigned 
to the governor as chief of the committee have critical accountability implications both in 
theory and practice. In this institutional set up, the governor effectively has complete 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Note that below the governorate level (the district, city and village level), the local executive committee 
is to assume the role of LSDA management committee.  
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control over the management of the account, with no accountability and/or deliberative 
link with the local popular council – with the exception of the one sitting member from 
the LPC on the LSDA committee, who is in theory appointed by the committee, and in 
practice appointed by the governor. There is also no involvement previewed for the heads 
of administrative districts, towns, quarters and service authorities within the scope of the 
governorate, who are important stakeholders in governorate LSDA expenditure 
management since governorate-wide development projects affect all sub-governorate 
administration levels, and vice-versa.59 
 
Recommended policy options 
To improve this constellation characterised by close to zero formal institutional 
accountability, it is recommended to expand the governorate LSDA committee to allow 
room for a greater and more divergent range of perspectives from the constituency. The 
variant reform options to expand the committee and establish a firmer link to the local 
“legislative” are: To expand the membership quota of LPC sitting members to more than 
just one, and to require the LPC’s vote on candidates for the committee posts on a regular 
basis, rather than having the committee itself appoint them. Another option is to expand 
the committee to include members from civil society organisations in addition to the LPC 
member, all elected by the LPC and accountable to it. Elections to the post should take 
place on a regular basis, for example every other year, to allow regular scrutiny of 
committee members’ local interest representation. Additionally, the rest of the members 
of the executive council of the governorate, i.e. the leaders of lower than governorate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Elsewhere, the law does in fact recognise these official stakeholders’ importance for the successful 
management of the governorate’s affairs and budget: in art. 32 of the local administration law no. 43/1979 
as amended, postulates their membership of the governorate executive council.	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level administration units, should at least be informed of LSDA decisions taken and asked 
for their feedback at crucial decision making junctures in the LSDA budget process. The 
latter recommendation serves to expand the local accountability scope of the governorate 
LSDA management, and to improve horizontal and vertical communication on it, in order 
to facilitate governorate-wide project development and implementation and to prevent 
waste in LSDA funds among the various levels of local administration within the 
governorate.60 
 
Implementation risk assessment 
We recognise the trade-off between budget management flexibility on the one hand, and 
inclusiveness and accountability of decision-making on the other. We also recognise that 
the greater the involvement of stakeholders, the greater the coordination and logistics 
burden on already strained local administrations.  There is also a risk that local officials 
would not follow provisions opening up the LSDA circle of trust or that new 
memberships to the committee and new accountability links might result in a higher 
information and accountability level on paper but not in practice. New members to the 
committee might be swiftly co-opted by the conventional committee members, and the 
LPC election of candidates could become a farce. Leaders of sub-governorate local units 
may not actually do anything constructive about the access they gain to the LSDA budget 
process, be it for lack of skill or willingness. But these implementation risks do not affect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  The	  reader	   is	  asked	   to	   take	  note	   that	  each	   local	  administration	   level	  can	  have	  an	  LSDA	  with	   the	  exception	  of	  the	  quarter.	  Information	  sharing	  is	  therefore	  important	  minimal	  condition	  to	  maximise	  positive	  externalities	  of	  LSDA	  use	  across	  the	  governorate,	  avoid	  duplication	  and	  lay	  a	  foundation	  for	  future	  governorate-­‐wide	  cooperation	  on	  comprehensive	  local	  development	  investment.	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the basic urgent requirement to experiment with ways of ensuring that LSDA decision-
making is not monopolised or oligopolised at the cost of the local public interest. 
 
2. On LSDA policy deliberation: Enforcing regular, more open committee deliberation 
on LSDA policy, projects & performance 
 
Legal provision 
The law prescribes regular, frequent committee conventions to enable a constant 
deliberation process on the purposes, objectives, and projects of the LSDA:  “The 
committee convenes at least once every month at the invitation of the chief or of his 
representative; and the assembly of the committee shall be correct with the presence of 
the majority of its members.”(Min. decr. no. 8/1976: ch.3, art. 3, § 1.4)  
 
Issue 
In practice, however, this important provision is not followed; committee deliberation 
fails to take place on a regular basis. According to anecdotal evidence, the governor 
generally takes decisions pertaining to the account’s management either by himself or in 
cooperation with select members of the committee, with very little reliance on regular 
committee convention. A second, closely related issue, is that – absent of any legal 
provisions relating to transparency in committee deliberation - decisions are taken behind 
closed doors, with no requirement to publicise them either to the LPC, heads of lower 
level administration units or to the local constituency at large. 
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Recommended reform policy option(s) 
To reverse this situation of close to zero formal deliberation, it is recommended that a 
new ministerial decree make committee meetings obligatory and introduce a penalty in 
case of failure to convene.  Acting as watchdog over the proper management of local 
finances, the LPC should enforce this penalty - and benefit from it.  To make LPC 
scrutiny of regular deliberation sessions possible, such a provision should be coupled with 
a transparency clause that requires at a minimum that the minutes of each committee 
meeting are made available immediately to the LPC.  
 
Implementation Risk Assessment 
Without parallel reform moves to render LSDA committee deliberation more transparent 
vis-à-vis the LPC, as suggested above, it will likely be near to impossible for the LPC or 
anyone else to monitor and enforce regular monthly conventions by the LSDA 
committee. It is thus crucial to combine obligatory conventions with increased 
transparency to obtain desired reform results. 
 




“The way in which it [the LSDA committee] issues its decisions is by majority vote of the 
present members and in case of a tie the decision shall go to the side on which the head of 
the committee [the governor] stands. […] The committee is permitted to form from 
among its members one or more subcommittees to which it delegates the study of a 
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portion of proposed projects as well as the presentation of a report thereon.” (Min. decr. 
no. 8/1976: Ch. 3, art 3 § 1. 4, 5; translation by the author) 
 
Issue(s) 
Thus the law governing policy deliberation and the budget preparation stage of the LSDA 
budget process does not envision any local participatory planning mechanism, nor the 
explicit involvement of the LPC in budget preparation.  LSDA policy deliberation and 
budget preparation is done entirely by the closed LSDA committee - that is, if it 
convenes.61 The risks to enhanced, equitable local development are obvious: Budget 
preparation is formally monopolised by the governor and his small LSDA committee 
consisting mainly of appointed – not elected - senior officials.  Thus there is no 
mechanism to ensure that decisions taken do in fact reflect local priorities and spread the 
benefits and costs of development projects fairly. Just like the LPC, the local constituency 
at large is barred from participating systematically in the process that links their local 
contributions with local expenditure for improved development outcomes. 
 
Recommended reform policy option(s) 
Congruent with the participatory budgeting reform trend in local administration across the 
world, including China, the GOE is advised to experiment with ways to ensure greater 
local voice in the formulation of the LSDA budget and reduce the gap between LSDA 
revenues and local development outcomes. To this aim, it is recommended that they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  As	  we	  will	   see	   in	   the	  next	   section,	   the	   formal	   role	  of	   the	  LPC	   is	   confined	   to	  approving	   the	  LSDA	  budget	  when	  presented	  with	  it	  by	  the	  LSDA	  committee.	  Otherwise	  it	  effectively	  has	  no	  formal	  say	  on	  LSDA	   expenditure	   management.	   As	   is,	   the	   LPC	   only	   has	   formal	   authority	   over	   LSDA	   revenue	  generation.	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accord a more explicit formal role to LPC- elected local interest representatives and/or 
mixed stakeholder groups from the constituency.  
 
It has already been suggested to expand the LSDA committee to include a number of 
elected representatives from the governorate and for better coordination and 
communication also link it with the rest of the governorate executive committee, i.e. with 
the heads of lower local administration units and service directorates.  
 
Additionally, it is recommended to give a clear legal mandate to the LSDA committee as 
concerns the creation of standing subcommittees for each crucial local development area, 
such as “basic infrastructure development”, “development in the agricultural sector”, etc. 
These cross-sectoral subcommittees are a promising institutional vehicle to open up and 
enrich the LSDA budget process to more stakeholders without necessarily adding to the 
workload of the LSDA committee or the LEC. Apart from taking on lower-level local 
administrators, these subcommittees may temporarily take on additional voluntary 
members from the governorate constituency for consultation and project development, 
and also hold public consultations to take views on potential projects as well as projects 
under deliberation.  
 
Implementation Risk Assessment 
Experimentation with participatory institutional structures in governorate LSDA budget 
preparation may encounter two important limitations.  First, senior local officials are 
unlikely to endorse such institutional reforms without significant quid-pro-quos, because 
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it means a drastic change in LSDA budget management that works against vested 
personal interests, and produces extra work for uncertain reward.  
Second, the institutional capacity to provide an effective logistical and administrative 
support is lacking at this stage. Targeted technical and financial backstopping is needed 
for such experimentation with new LSDA participatory budgeting structures to be 
constructive. Gathering information on local priorities is one challenge, digesting it and 
incorporating it into the budget is yet another. This is why it is advised that, in parallel to 
passing the necessary regulation, the MoLD decentralisation support unit also devise and 
implement a capacity building strategy to this aim. 
 
V.1.4  Budget Approval / Authorisation  
Legal provision 
“The committee sets the plan for the projects to whose execution it sees from the 
revenue of the account […] this plan enters into force upon the decision by the executive 
committee of the governorate, after the agreement of the local popular council. The 
[LSDA] committee shall compute a budget for the account’s projects and present it to the 
local council at least two months before the beginning of the financial year. This budget is 
issued by the authority of the governor, after the agreement of the LPC.” (Min. decr. no. 
8/1976: Ch.3, art.3, §1.8, 1.9; translation by the author)  
 
Issue(s) 
The LPC completely lacks decision-making power in the budget approval stage of the 
LSDA, with its formal role being confined to approving the LSDA budget when 
presented with it by the LSDA committee. Yet, without right of scrutiny of the LSDA 
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budget, the moves suggested above (to expand the decision-making circle to 
systematically include especially elected local representatives, and to raise the 
accountability and transparency level in LSDA management for better development 
outcomes) remain practically futile. Greater voice also requires greater budget scrutiny 
rights.  
 
Recommended reform policy option(s) 
It is therefore recommended to strengthen the LPC’s right of scrutiny over the LSDA 
budget. The proposed reform policy options are to give the governorate LPC veto power 
over the whole or parts of the LSDA budget. This has the potential to incentivise the 
LSDA committee to involve local stakeholders early on, in the formulation stage of the 
LSDA budget process.  
 
Because true fiscal decentralisation will require according real legislative powers to the 
LPC, LPC budgetary empowerment with such a radical short-term reform of the LSDA 
budget process can simultaneously be an important stepping stone, enabling policy 
makers to observe the practical impact of according greater budget authority to elected 
local bodies in an isolated instance. 
 
Implementation Risk Assessment 
The developmental success of a new provision by ministerial decree that gives concrete 
scrutiny rights to the LPC is contingent upon the ability and/or willingness of the LPC to 
make use of its right to veto/amend the LSDA budget as appropriate.  It also relies on two 
additional conditions: First, the LSDA budget should be prepared by the LSDA 
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committee in complete, accurate, and detailed manner and in a format intelligible to all 
sitting members. Otherwise, the LPC’s ability to contribute to the LSDA budget process 
is likely to be frustrated. Secondly, LPC members need to have or to develop the capacity 
to participate actively in budgeting expenditure programmes from the LSDA (compare 
Andrews & Shah, in Shah, 2005:183 - 216).  
 
V.I.5 Budget Monitoring and Evaluation 
Legal provision 
“The accounting unit in the general diwan of the governorate keeps account on 
what has been accomplished in terms of revenue collection and what has been 
accomplished in terms of expenditure from this amount; and this in addition to the other 
necessary supporting documentation for the good running of the work and the 
accurateness of the accounts. […] Any spending has to be authorised by the head of the 
committee or whoever he delegates for that purpose and any withdrawal from this 
account has to be via cheques signed first, by the general secretary of the governorate and 
second, by the chief accountant in charge or his deputy. […] The accounts of the income 
and spending of the preceding month must be prepared in the first week of each month, 
from the records and documents; and it must be presented to the committee for its 
decision [emphasis added]. ” (Min. decr. No. 8/1976: ch.3, art.3, § 1.13,1.16,1.18) 
 
Issue(s) 
LSDA performance monitoring involves both monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring 
requires overseeing and controlling the proper accounting for and implementation of 
running local development projects. Evaluation aims to establish whether money spent on 
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projects has produced intended results.  It should typically be conducted by the 
governorate administration upon completion of a budget cycle to inform the next round of 
project budget planning. Thus both monitoring and evaluation can provide invaluable 
information to local policy makers about achievements, shortcomings, and room for 
future improvement in the LSDA budget process to reduce the gap between money spent 
and local development outcomes achieved.  
 
However, central government legal requirements and directives with respect to both of 
these potentially crucial elements for local development - monitoring and evaluation - are 
wanting. And the only provision on monitoring LSDA accounting in the ministerial 
decree no. 8/1976 (as quoted above) violates the principle of separating strategic and 
operational controls in sound budget management.  Thus, in the current system, the 
LSDA committee (and in the many cases practically just the governor) controls LSDA 
policy, LSDA budgeting, LSDA execution and it exercises ultimate fiscal budget control 
over its own doings, while political and citizen budget controls are largely absent – thus, 
the zero transparency and accountability LSDA budget cycle is complete. Moreover, even 
assuming the best intentions and skills on the part of the governor and the LSDA 
committee, learning from and improving on projects past is a remote possibility given that 
LSDA budget evaluation lacks any perceptible role in the yearly governorate LSDA 
budget cycle.   
 
Recommended reform policy option(s) 
The first most basic reform recommendation on the monitoring function is to transfer 
ultimate fiscal budget control over LSDA project budgets to the LPC budget and planning 
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committee by amending ministerial decree no. 8/1976 ch.3, art.3, § 1.18 so that monthly 
LSDA accounts must be presented to the LPC for scrutiny rather than the LSDA 
committee. A more advanced reform policy option would be to add to this amendment the 
novel introduction of legally mandated quarterly or mid-year reviews of LSDA budget 
execution by the LPC. These reviews should ideally take place in a meeting open to the 
interested public. Such external transparency may not only raise the likelihood that these 
actually take place but also increases points of contact with the local stakeholder 
community in the LSDA budget process. A third, still more advanced reform option 
would be to legally require a systematic role for evaluation at the end of each LSDA 
budget cycle. 
 
Implementation Risk Assessment 
Implementing these phased reform recommendations runs two risks: lack of willingness 
to comply on the part of appointed officials and lack of administrative capacity and 
technical know-how to enable both administrative compliance and meaningful 
participation on the part of local stakeholder groups. But this does not alter the 
desirability to start experimenting with uniform monitoring and evaluation requirements 
as a cornerstone of the local budget cycle now. Effective budget monitoring and 
evaluation is paramount to successful fiscal decentralisation, so building local capacity in 
one budget area today can only help respond to higher demands on and opportunities for 









This thesis research has explored how to reform local extra-budgetary funds and 
accounts in Egypt, in explicit recognition of their high costs and risks to good budget 
governance, as well as their potential both to boost local needs-based development now – 
as the experience of China demonstrates - and, in the meantime, to provide a valuable 
testing ground for future fiscal decentralisation reforms in Egypt. 
 
Progressing analytically from the general to the specific, this research starts by extracting 
general lessons from comparing and contrasting international public finance advice on 
EBFs with the experience of China in the context of national fiscal decentralisation and 
budget reforms since the 1980s (Macro-analytical level). Next, we conducted a SWOT 
analysis of the local EBF governance framework in Egypt (Meso-level), and finally, 
applied both international lessons and national insights gained as we developed short-
term reform recommendations on increasing budget control over the governorate-level 
local services and development accounts (Micro-level). 
 
The following synthesises this research project’s findings on the different analytical 
levels into a single local EBF reform strategy outline for Egypt: 
1. There is no quick fix to local EBFs. The core lesson from China for Egypt is that 
their reform should be considered part and parcel of a comprehensive, phased 
budget and decentralisation reform strategy whose success will depend in large 
part on visionary experimentation leading to broader replication and course 
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corrections. In China, all major budget reform measures to date, including those 
targeting budget control of local EBFs, have been pilot-tested (and adapted) for a 
period between one to three years in selected provinces or government entities 
before approval of nation-wide endorsement. 
 
2. Key to success along the way is the clear definition of baseline objectives – 
presumed here to be boosting needs-based local development and state legitimacy 
across Egypt – and firm, sustained policy direction towards these objectives by the 
top executive of the GOE. Any reform policy option or action along the path of 
budget and decentralisation reform should be measured against this yardstick. 
Reform measures connected to local EBFs need to be explicitly, continuously and 
forcefully endorsed by top leadership or else, they will have little impact on the 
ground. This is another crucial lesson for Egypt from China, where central 
government has since the early 1980s consistently cultivated the message to local 
administrators that compliance is a must. This was done through a long-term 
combination of institutional reform measures, mass mobilisation and even severe 
selective crackdowns on deviators. 
 
3. Studying and understanding the complex role of local EBFs in the current system 
of governance is key to formulating a promising reform strategy that balances the 
costs and benefits of local extrabudgetary funds in reference to the GOE’s 
ultimate policy objectives. In the present, highly centralised budget system, extra-
budgetary local funds and accounts not only epitomise and compensate for 
systemic failures, but provide the only local fiscal mechanism in Egypt for needs-
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based local development that is available immediately. Again, the lesson from 
China is that so long as the national budget system is inadequately equipped to 
address acute local fiscal needs through the regular budgetary process, the local 
extrabudgetary system cannot be abolished entirely. Instead, policy makers should 
follow China’s example and work realistically with “what they have” to achieve 
their ultimate objectives: boosting local economic development and popular 
legitimacy.   
 
4. The Chinese experience demonstrates that in the absence of sufficient other local 
finance, local EBFs have the capacity to produce significant socio-economic 
benefits in the short- to medium-term despite their potentially significant costs to 
the national purse. However, in the longer term, China’s experience also shows 
how local EBFs can take on disastrous dimensions in the absence of sufficient 
budget controls - especially so in combination with rapid fiscal decentralisation 
reforms. Egyptian policy makers are therefore advised to keep a keen eye on local 
EBFs, progressively develop better local budget controls in the short-term (as 
suggested in chapter VI), and better national budget controls in the longer term 
until eventually, the merger and/or elimination of local EBFs can become possible 
without jeopardising the achievement of superior local development objectives. 
 
5. Managing local EBFs risks and costs whilst taking advantage of their strengths 
and opportunities as Egypt moves along the budget and decentralisation reform 
path requires political economy realism, as highlighted by China’s budget reform 
history since the early 1980s in particular. Egyptian policy makers should seek to 
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develop sensible quid pro quo incentive structures for local administrations, if 
they want to reform local EBFs successfully, and to do so without obliterating 
local development and state legitimacy baseline policy objectives. Thus, China’s 
lesson for Egypt is that political economy realism in recognition of how much 
budget control capacity is available at any given point in time can demand the 
application of both formal and informal incentivising measures, so long as they 
further overall policy goals. 
 
6. It has been shown that the key to improving the local EBF system in Egypt lies in 
raising the level of budget control in its three composite dimensions - fiscal, 
political and citizen budget control. Longer-term fiscal budget control reforms, 
namely the progressive installation of the Treasury Single Account system, are 
already underway in Egypt.62 In the meantime, local engagement of citizens and 
their representatives in budget control is a potentially swifter, and less costly 
reform measure than fiscal budget control measures. Moreover, it can 
simultaneously enhance political budget control because it serves both presumed 
core objectives of the GOE - that is, enhanced local needs-based development and 
popular state legitimacy. In the first instance, Egyptian policy makers should 
hence consider improving local citizen control over local extrabudgetary funds 
and accounts to achieve a higher weighted combination of the three composite 
dimensions of budget control in a shortest time frame possible. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  On	  TSA	  reforms	  cf.	  section	  V.2.2,	  p.	  75	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7. Short-term GOE reform policy should thus aim primarily at establishing a direct 
link between local budgetary flexibility and local economic development through 
greater citizen budget control, a recommendation consistent with the view of 
senior Egyptian officials and researchers in the field. Arguably, the best means 
available to achieve this is through the establishment of improved accountability 
and transparency mechanisms in local extrabudgetary budget management - by 
decree. Our legal-regulatory case study of reforming governorate-level local 
services and account budget management has provided a number of suggestions in 
this regard. Next to advancing the primary local development and state legitimacy 
goals, such a local budget control reform move can provide a dual future pay-off: 
reducing the costs and risks of local EBFs in the short-term as well as preparing 
the ground for upcoming legal fiscal decentralisation reforms. 
                    
Outlook 
On a final note, the conclusions drawn here on what to do about local extrabudgetary 
funds in Egypt, based on lessons learned from China, tie into the most recent internal 
reform resolution of the GOE. The various extrabudgetary financing mechanisms 
currently available at the local level are to be consolidated into one nationwide, 
standardised and transparent local financing mechanism, open also for additional 
financing by both government and development partners. This so-called Local 
Development Fund would entail a thorough realignment of institutional incentives on the 
local administration level and, as such, is intended to provide a new cross-sectoral 
framework for the streamlining of local development programming and service delivery 
following harmonised guidelines.  
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This research project considers itself part of the current effort to figure out ways on how 
to get there without obliterating the Egyptian government’s pressing mandate to deliver 
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APPENDIX A: 
Defining extrabudgetary funds in application to Egyptian local finance 
 
 
  Although the term extrabudgetary fund seems self-explanatory at first, a 
closer look at the pertinent public finance literature reveals that defining extrabudgetary 
funds and accounts has become less of a clear-cut technical issue than a matter of 
judgement on a particular fund or account’s institutional set-up in terms of its relative 
segregation from the regular budgetary system in relation to financial management, 
budget procedures and control.   
 
„The term “extrabudgetary” can be considered as an umbrella concept that 
may be used in several ways, each emphasizing a different aspect of the issue.” 
(Allen & Radev, 2006:9) 
 
„Definition is all important. To the extent that EBFs operate under separate 
budget formulation and execution procedures, with their own chart of accounts, 
they may undermine accuracy and transparency of the financial accounts. The 
term EBF is misleading, and is a remnant of an earlier era when many special 
funds were entirely off-budget. Today, a wider array of funds exist, some of which 
may be reported in the annual budget even if not approved in the budget 
[emphasis added].“ (Dorotinsky, 2008) 
 
“Extrabudgetary activities are transactions of general government entities 
that are not included in the central or subnational budget appropriation laws. 
Extrabudgetary funds are usually created by a law stating their purpose, financing, 
administration, and other arrangements. They may be managed by the ministry of 
finance, line ministries, or other spending agencies, or they may be completely 
autonomous.“  (IMF, 2007: 63)  
 
“A broad definition of EBF is that they constitute all resources managed 
directly or indirectly by administrative branches of the government outside the 
normal budgetary process [...] From the perspective of public expenditure 
management the critical distinction between budgetary and extrabudgetary funds 
is the extent to which the resources are put through the normal budgetary 
deliberations [emphasis added].” (Bird & Wong, 2005: 18)   
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Moreover, the way in which ‘budget’ is defined is also very important when 
conceptualising the ‘extra-budgetary’ nature of a particular fund or accounts. If the 
concept is restricted to annual appropriation of funds by the legislature, it captures a far 
more limited proportion of total fiscal transactions, whereas the concept of the 
consolidated (unified) budget includes both the general budget and certain extrabudgetary 
transactions (IMF, 2007, Manual on Fiscal Transparency).  
 
As the literature on China’s extra-budgetary funds shows, the definition of what 
constitutes EBFs in a particular country context can be diverse and even change 
considerably over time: 
 „The primary motivation for the development of EBF in China, especially at the 
subnational level, has clearly been revenue enhancement rather than earmarking. [...] 
Following Soviet practice, explicit extrabudgetary funds were first created in the early 
1950s as small amounts of funds set aside from centralized management and control. As 
the concept evolved, however, EBF came to refer to fees and funds that are not taxes or 
budgetary items but that nonetheless are specifically authorized by some government 
body. This definition leaves out significant public resources that are neither budgetary nor 
extrabudgetary in this sense.  Such funds are variously called self-raised funds, extra-
extrabudgetary funds, off- budgetary funds, or extra-system revenues.  For all these 
reasons, it is far from simple to tell just what is being counted in references to 
extrabudgetary resources in China.“  (Wong & Bird, 2005:19) 
 
In consideration of the above, this research project considers the set of Egyptian local 
special funds and accounts ‘extrabudgetary hybrids’ because they display many 
substantive ‘extrabudgetary’ characteristics: They are legally authorised separate 
government entities63 for (a range of) specified purposes and activities,64 financed from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  „There may, however, be government entities with a separate legal identity and substantial autonomy, 
including discretion over the volume and composition of their expenditures and a direct source of revenue, 
such as earmarked taxes. These entities should be treated as separate government units if they maintain full 
sets of accounts, own goods or assets in their own right, engage in nonmarket activities for which they are 
held accountable at law, and are able to … enter into contracts.“ (GSFM, 2001, paragraph 2.24) 64	  Note that these decrees usually lack specificity and rarely contain detailed criteria for the use of funds as 
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earmarked revenues and run separately from the regular budgetary system in the sense 
that they are shielded from the general budget appropriation process and their funds may 
not be reverted to the central treasury (compare also Allen & Radev, 2006: 10- 13).65 
 
At the same time, however, from a consolidated budget perspective, they are not strictly 
speaking extrabudgetary: Most local funds’ and all LSDAs have been incorporated into 
the Treasury Single Account System via a zero-accounts procedure – they are hence 
technically speaking not off the MoF’s radar anymore.  Moreover, aggregate revenues 
and expenditures of the local special funds and LSDAs are in fact reported on the annual 
budget as total estimates and may therefore be considered as consolidated into general 
budget reporting. But apart from the overall volume of activities no further information 
on their budgets and activities is furbished so that effectively the budget control linkage to 
the budget deliberations of the Egypt’s legislature is absent.66 Also, being treated by law 
as public funds in terms of reporting requirements and accountability clearly does not 
enhance their extra-budgetary quality. At the same time treatment as public funds does 
not defy their extrabudgetary nature either, congruent as it is with best (consolidated 
budget) practice in EBF fiscal transparency: 
“Extrabudgetary activities should be identified in the annual budget or an annex to 
the budget. [They] should be subject to audit and should publish financial 
statements covering all inflows and outflows and, if relevant, the allocation and 
return on assets.” (IMF, 2007:63)  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
explored under section 4.1.This gives leeway to willing and capable local entities to manage the particulars 
of their affairs as they see fit. Many are internal documents/executive regulations known only to the 
relevant authorities so there is no informational accountability link to the legislature. 65	  Section	  4.1	  expands	  in	  greater	  detail	  on	  the somewhat peculiar and less clear-cut case of the LSDA.	  66	  Provided,	  one	  concurs	  with	  Mayfield’s	  argument	  that	  Egypt	  “is	  an	  executive-­‐oriented	  system	  with	  no	  real	  legislative	  functions	  at	  the	  local	  administrative	  system	  level.	  Even	  the	  local	  people’s	  councils	  at	  the	  various	  levels	  are	  considered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  executive	  branch	  of	  government	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  perform	  “legislative”	  functions,	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense	  of	  the	  word.”	  (1996:96)	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In the absence of a widely accepted term that conveys the peculiar institutional set-up of 
the local special funds and the LSDA in Egyptian local fiscal administration displaying 
both substantive extrabudgetary characteristics and technical on-budget characteristics, 
this paper has chosen to term and treat them as ‘local EBFs’ for the purposes of this 
research. This is considered justified to the extent to which they operate under budget 
formulation and execution procedures separate to the general budget system, have their 
own accounts, and tend to undermine the accuracy and transparency of financial accounts 
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Appendix B: 
List of Interviewees 
 
Surname First name Position/Organisation Place Date 
Abdel Latif Lobna Senior advisor to the Minister 
of local development 
Cairo, 
Egypt 
8th of July 
2009 
Abdel Wahab Samir Director of the Public 
Administration Research and  











13th of July 
2009 










16th of July, 
3rd of 
August 2009 
El Emam El Shawi Mohamed Undersecretary of the Ministry 
of economic development,  
Public finance advisor, 
Egyptian decentralisation 
Initiative (EDI), USAID 
Cairo, 
Egypt 
26th of July 
2009 
Sawy Ali Professor, Cairo University Cairo, 
Egypt 
20th of July 
2009 
Shalaan Ihab Project Manager, Strategic 
Urban Planning for Small 
Cities, 
UNHABITAT (General 






Shehata Khattab Abdallah Advisor to the Macrofiscal 
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Interview questions used in standardised, open-ended interviewing 
1. Status quo 
• What laws and regulations govern local special funds and the local service and 
development accounts?  
• What are the costs and benefits connected to the existence & use of local special 
funds at the moment?  
 
Alternative questions depending on interviewee: 
o  Why do special funds exist? What are the main problems with them?  
o From your perspective, what would be the impact of eliminating special 
funds with the system as is? 
 
• How has the installation of the TSA system affected the handling of local special 
funds and accounts?  
Additional question depending on the interviewee: Have all accounts been 
incorporated into the new system? 
 
• What are the broad trends in local funds’ expenditure?  
Additional question depending on the interviewee: Why do you think is there such 
a strong variation in the structure and the uses of local funds across constituencies 
in Egypt?  
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2. Potential reforms 
 
• In your view, what are the primary adjustments that the current system requires in 
view of enhancing the effective use of local resources for needs-based local 
development? With respect to the following dimensions:  
o General management & decision making structure 
o Budget formulation 
o Approval 
o Implementation 
o Evaluation & monitoring 
 
• Where do you see a potential reform of the local special funds fit into your broad 
vision of decentralisation reform? (Alternatively, do you think there will always be 
a need for local special funds in Egypt?) 
 
• Which governmental bodies should take a greater oversight/ coordination/ 
capacity building role to this aim, in what ways? 
 
3. Questions seeking detail on status quo 
 
• What are the main revenue sources of LSDA? 
• What are the different uses of the local services and development account? In 
particular, what are the main types of revenue generating projects and productive 
enterprises financed from the LSDA? 
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Additional questions depending on the interviewee: 
o Can you explain the Mahagir (quarry) to me? 
o Can you explain the road account to me? 
o Apart from running local projects of course, what are the chapter 1 and 2 
























The Egyptian local administration system in brief 
The Egyptian system of administration has been described as one of 
“administrative deconcentration without authority” (Amin, 2006:1) and as “a composite 
of a central unitary functional system and the hierarchical processes implied in a 
prefectoral system” (Mayfield, 1996: 80).  
 
The local administration system has three levels for fully urban governorates (the 
governorate, city and quarter), and four levels in rural-urban governorates (governorate, 
administrative district, city, as well as village and quarter). A centrally appointed, senior 
administrative official heads each local administration unit, with the executive 
responsibility to represent the central government in the constituency. To name but two 
examples, the governor is appointed by, accountable to, and acts as representative of the 
president in the governorate, while the chief of the administrative districts is appointed by 
and serves at the pleasure of the Prime Minister.  
 
Each local administration unit has two councils: the centrally appointed local Executive 
Council (LEC) - comprising the heads of lower local administration units and the 
representatives of public authorities and line ministry directorates on the same 
administrative level - and the Local People’s Council (LPC), which is elected every four 
years. Policy-making and budget authority lies first and foremost with the LECs, while 
LPCs in reality have highly limited powers beyond approving LEC policy. One can 
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therefore speak of “a form of democratic centralism, whereby the local executive 
councils are, at least in theory, answerable to both the elected people’s council and the 
higher-level central administration.”(Mayfield, 1996: 79) Generally, the system relies on 
top-down, vertical systems of direction and control 
 
The Egyptian budget system in brief 
On paper, the budget planning process is bottom-up and goes as follows: the 
Ministry of Finance sends out financial guidelines and the Ministry of economic 
development the technical guidelines. According to these guidelines, local budget 
authorities (directorates, the diwan, the LEC & LPC) draft local budgets proposals; 
following approval by the relevant LPC these are submitted to the next higher 
administration level until the governorate level which incorporates all budget proposals 
into one general budget proposal document, a “wish-list”; this governorate budget 
proposal goes to the MoLD for review and then to the MoED and the MoF who include it 
into the state general budget for parliamentary approval (Sawy, 1995:170; Shand, 2005: 
17). In practice, the budget planning effectively starts again once available funding 
through the approved budget is clear:  central budget priorities normally take precedence 
over local priorities, and where budget cuts are made, these are hard to match with 
projects due to the institutional fragmentation in budget preparation and execution. For 
example, a governorate project in the transportation sector requires the coordination of 
about six budget authorities67 (Abdel Latif, personal communication, June 15, 2009).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  i.e.	  the	  Ministry	  of	  housing,	  ministry	  of	  transportation,	  roads	  and	  bridges	  authority,	  governorate	  diwan,	  rail	  authority,	  and	  the	  transport	  directorate	  




Chart of key legislation68  	  	  
Decree of the Ministerial Committee for local administration no. 31/ 1967: On the 
financial affairs and management of productive enterprises 
Law 10/ 2005 Amending Law no 30 / 1976 Regarding General Cleanliness 
 
Local Administration Law no. 43/1979 as amended 
Ministerial Decree no. 8/ 1976: Law Organizing the Local Services and Development 
Accounts. Ministry of Local Government 
Presidential Decree no. 139/2006: On local accountability 
Public Tender and Bidding Law no. 89/1998 as amended 
The State's General Budget Law no. 53/1973 as Amended by Law no. 1/1979 and Law 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  This	  listing	  is	  in	  alphabetic	  order	  
